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This thesis endeavors to bring analytical clarity to the assumptions that inform 
proposed policy solutions to the alarming rise in violence in Central America. The thesis 
evaluates three of the most common hypotheses for citizen insecurity in the region: the 
impact of structural economic problems like poverty and inequality; the efficacy of state 
criminological approaches; and the effectiveness of internal security institutions. To 
evaluate each hypothesis, the thesis uses a comparative case analysis of Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. In spite of dramatic divergence in violence outcomes, the two countries share 
many variables including geographical proximity, economic development challenges, a 
history of civil conflict, and democratic transition in the 1990s. Using homicide rates as 
the most reliable indicator of violence, the findings reveal that structural economic 
problems like poverty and inequality have only an imperfect correlation with citizen 
security. On the contrary, variables that correlate more closely with peaceful security 
outcomes include the effectiveness of security institutions—characterized by 
sophisticated plans, sound structures, and adequate resources—and rigorous 
criminological approaches as characterized by community involvement, efficient 
intelligence-gathering mechanisms, and recidivism reduction programs. The thesis’s 
implications pertain not only to Central America but also to troubled regions throughout 
the world. 
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Of the 50 most violent cities in the world, 47 are found in Latin America, and of 
these, nine are found within Central America.1 With by far the highest homicide rate of 
any city, the capital of El Salvador, San Salvador, emerges as the world’s most dangerous 
place to live, with 188 homicides per 100,000 people each year.2 In the same region, 
Nicaragua stands out as an international success story with a homicide rate of just eight 
per 100,000 inhabitants.3 Central American states share many factors, including 
organized crime, corruption, geography as a transit point for drug traffickers, and 
development challenges, while also varying in terms of recent histories of civil war, 
authoritarian pasts, method of transition to democracy, economic policies, anti-crime 
policies, and levels of U.S. involvement. What accounts for the high levels of violence in 
some countries in Central America, and why are some countries in the region more 
disposed to violence than others? The overarching purpose of this thesis is to bring 
analytical clarity to the theoretical explanations for the problem of violence in Central 
America, which often inform policy prescriptions and U.S. foreign assistance approaches. 
Existing literature commonly ascribes equal weight to the different variables believed to 
cause or correlate with violence in Central America. This thesis sets out to rigorously 
evaluate common hypotheses. The purpose is to assess the strength of each tested 
hypotheses by using objective criteria to measure correlations with observed violence 
outcomes. Such analytical clarity should lead to the basis for better informed policy 
responses to the alarming phenomenon of skyrocketing violence in certain Central 
American republics.  
This chapter begins with a review of the prevailing theoretical explanations for 
violence in Central America, from which emerge the three primary hypotheses that I will 
test: the structural economic hypothesis, the rational choice criminology hypothesis, and 
                                                 
1 “Daily Chart: Revisiting the World’s Most Violent Cities,” Economist, March 30, 2016. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/03/daily-chart-18.  
2 Ibid. 
3 David Gagne, “InSight Crime 2015 Homicide Round-up,” InSight Crime, January 14, 2016, 
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean. 
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the institutionalist hypothesis. I then outline my research design, which consists of a 
comparative case study model. The chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis’s 
methodology.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis examines the most common theoretical approaches that scholars, think 
tanks, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), intergovernmental organizations (IGO), 
and others use to explain the causes of violence in Central America. The literature 
consists of four basic theoretical approaches: structuralism, institutionalism, 
constructivism, and criminology theory. I outline the main arguments within each 
theoretical approach, which will lead into an examination of the most compelling 
hypotheses. 
Structuralists contend factors external to individual agency constrain and shape 
the behavior of individuals toward fixed outcomes.4 Structuralists fall into four categories 
of analysis pertinent to the problem of violence in society. The first group argues that 
poor economic conditions create structural conditions for violence to flourish. Some 
within this group highlight unemployment and the lack of social mobility as a key driver 
to delinquency, especially for young adult males.5 Some attribute increasing violence in 
Central America specifically to worsening economic conditions and increasing inequality 
since democratic transitions.6 Others point to the concept of social alienation or exclusion 
from citizenship—as a result of poverty and economic inequality—as the primary cause 
of violence.7  
                                                 
 4 Diego Esparza, Antonio Ugues Jr., and Paul Hernandez, The History of Mexican Drug Policy, 
Western Political Science Association, March 22–24, 2012 (Portland, OR), 4–5. 
http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/esparza1.pdf.  
 5 Richard M. McGahey, “Economic Conditions, Neighborhood Organization, and Urban Crime.” 
Crime and Justice 8 (1986): 231. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147429. 
 6 Caroline Moser and Ailsa Winton, “Violence in the Central American Region: Towards an Integrated 
Framework of Violence Reduction,” Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002): 21. 
http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/1826.pdf.  
 7 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, “Fractured Cities, Second-Class Citizenship and Urban Violence,” in 
Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America, eds. Kees 
Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 12, 21; Caroline Moser and Catherine 
McIlwaine, Violence in a Post-Conflict Context: Urban Poor Perceptions from Guatemala (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2001), 15. 
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The second group of structuralists uses a path dependency paradigm to account 
for structures they contend are conducive to high levels of violence in Central America. 
Diane E. Davis argues three structural processes converged to cause the current violence 
crisis in many Latin American countries. For Davis, “contested state formation, the 
institutionalization of an authoritarian political apparatus and its coercive arms, and 
industrialization-led urbanization” result in structures conducive to violence.8 Charles T. 
Call emphasizes the role of war transitions and the need for demilitarization of internal 
security forces to establish structures that deter and reduce violent outcomes.9  
The final two structural approaches center on material factors: geography and the 
prevalence of weapons. Central American republics share the common geographical 
attribute of acting as “bridge states” for narcotics traffickers from South America.10 
Many, like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), observe that this 
geographic position acts as a corrosive structural influence on all of the states, given that 
the massive sums of illicit money involved in the drug trade.11 Nevertheless, the relative 
geographic position of each state is similar enough to preclude geography to be one of the 
main causal factors behind the variance in levels of violence. As for the impact of 
weapons, some postulate that widespread availability of firearms within societies causes 
elevated violence rates. This line of argument contends that failing to enact effective gun-
control policies has created structural conditions for violence in many countries.12  
The institutional framework theorizes that the efficacy—or lack thereof—of 
institutions like the state, judiciary, police, and military primarily determines crime and 
violence outcomes. One group of scholars focuses on historical effects on institutions 
                                                 
 8 Diane E. Davis, “The Political and Economic Origins of Violence and Insecurity in Contemporary 
Latin America,” in Violent Democracies in Latin America, ed. Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. 
Goldstein (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 37. 
 9 Charles T. Call, “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America,” Comparative 
Politics 35, no. 1 (2002), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4146925.  
 10 Julie Marie Bunck and Michael Ross Fowler, Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation: Drug Trafficking 
and the Law in Central America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 384. 
 11 Theodore Leggett, “Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire,” UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (May 2007): 25–26. 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Central_America_Study_2007.pdf.  
12 Ibid., 67–68.  
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unique to each country’s past as the independent variable causing violent outcomes. Hall 
and Taylor define historical institutionalism as “explaining how institutions…structure a 
nation’s response to new challenges” by examining the unique paths of each country’s 
history and their effects on institutions.13 With respect to Central America, some 
historical institutionalists contend that civil war periods had deleterious effects on key 
state institutions in manners unique to each country. Cruz contends that “violent 
entrepreneurs” from the civil war period in Northern Triangle states (El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala) persist within state institutions and act as a corrosive 
influence, facilitating an atmosphere of lawlessness and of violence.14 Fuentes argues that 
the civil war has diminished institutional capacities on a broad front by reducing vital 
economic and social investments.15 
Some institutionalists emphasize the corrupting influence of wealthy narco-
trafficking organizations on institutions like the police, military, legislatures, state 
bureaucracies, and judiciaries. Moises Naim notes a global trend since the Great 
Recession in which criminal traffickers have stepped up efforts to corrupt, manipulate, 
and infiltrate state institutions.16 Julie Bunck and Michael Fowler observe that these 
criminal trafficking organizations in Central America use “bribes, bullets, and 
intimidation” to weaken and coerce institutions.17 In a related vein, others hypothesize 
that Central American states suffer from inadequate funding of key state institutions, 
resulting in diminished state capacities to deter and prosecute violent actors.18 
                                                 
13 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and Three New Institutionalisms, Max-
Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung (MPIFG), May 9, 1996 (Köln, Germany: MPIFG Scientific 
Advisory Board, 1996), 9. http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2782/pdf/dp96_6.pdf.  
14 José Miguel Cruz, “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the 
Violent State,” Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 4 (2011): 25. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41342343.  
 15 Juan Alberto Fuentes, “Violent Conflict and Development in Latin America: The Cases of 
Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala,” UNDP Human Development Reports (2005): section III - III.1. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/violent-conflict-and-human-development-latin-america.  
 16 Moises Naim, “Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2012), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-04-20/mafia-states.  
 17 Bunck and Fowler, Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation. 
 18 Jose Miguel Cruz, “Violence, Insecurity, and Elite Maneuvering,” in Public Security and Police 
Reform in the Americas, eds. John Bailey and Lucía Dammert (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2006). 
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Some scholars use a civil-military relations framework to analyze how effectively 
institutions create conditions for social cohesion and violence reduction in societies. 
Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei’s civil-military relations framework includes not 
only the military but also institutions that deal with public security like police and 
intelligence agencies.19 Bruneau and Matei created a trinity for analyzing civil-military 
relations consisting of “democratic civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency.”20 The 
effectiveness concept assumes that the military, police, and intelligence agencies—when 
functioning effectively—are institutions that enforce order and peaceful coexistence. To 
assess the effectiveness of these institutions, Matei proposes three indicators: plans, 
structures, and resources.21 
The constructivist approach to explaining the causes of violence in societies 
emphasizes the role of culture, identity, and other social phenomenon. Some argue that 
destruction of social capital in certain Central American countries through civil war and 
conflict has caused elevated violence rates.22 Others contend that violence stems from a 
subculture—often gang-related—of young men in Latin America characterized by a 
sense of machismo that strongly encourages violent behavioral responses to certain 
situations.23 Another hypothesis centers on the social constructs that drive individuals 
toward gang membership and violence, namely the gap between constructed media 
images of the good life and poor individuals’ experience of life on the streets.24  
                                                 
 19 Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil Military Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: 
Routledge, 2015), 26.  
20 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Civil Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox 
Revisited,” Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 19, no. 1–2 (2005): 122. 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a485204.pdf. 
21 Matei, “A New Conceptualization,” 32.  
22 Juan Alberto Fuentes, “Violent conflict and human development in Latin America: The cases of 
Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala,” Human Development Report, UN Development Programme 
(2005): III.4. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/violent-conflict-and-human-development-latin-america.  
23 Howard S. Erlanger, “Estrangement, Machismo, and Gang Violence,” Social Science Quarterly 60, 
no. 2 (1979): 235. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2503146.  
 24 John Hagerdorn, “Gang Violence in the Postindustrial Era,” Crime and Justice 24 (1998): 365, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147588.  
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Criminology theory uses several distinct academic approaches to account for the 
causes of violence. Sociology, psychology, and rational choice theory constitute three of 
the most common criminological explanations. From a sociological perspective, some 
contend that crime and violence involve a process of communication transmitted through 
social interaction that imparts “not only the techniques of committing crime, but also the 
shaping of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.”25 Others use a sociological 
approach but focus specifically on criminal subcultures, including the conditions that 
foment such subcultures and the behavioral patterns imbued by them.26 Criminologists 
like Herbert Bloch observe that the “differential response” of individuals in similar social 
situations points to the role of individual psychology and choice.27 A classic 
psychological approach considers the detrimental psychological effects of violence in 
childhood on both aggressor and victim.28 Another psychological approach develops a 
theory of self-control imparted primarily through close monitoring of behavior 
throughout childhood, mainly by the family and the school; the absence of inculcated 
self-control leads to individuals who inappropriately judge the benefits of criminal 
behavior to outweigh the costs.29 The final criminological approach, rational choice 
theory, assumes that individuals conduct a cost-benefit analysis when determining 
whether they will commit a crime; consequently, the state can “control crime by adjusting 
the certainty, severity, and celerity of the sanctions at its disposal” and thereby deter 
criminal actions.30 
                                                 
25 Herbert A Bloch and Gilbert Geis, Man, Crime, and Society (New York: Random House, 1962), 
113.  
26 Ibid., 128. The authors explain the theory of Albert K. Cohen. 
27 Ibid., 127. 
28 N. A. Card, “Toward a Relationship Perspective on Aggression Among Schoolchildren: Integrating 
Social Cognitive and Interdependence Theories,” Psychology of Violence 1, no. 3 (2011): 188. 
http://psycnet.apa.org/?&fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/a0023711.  
29 Michael R. Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1990), 119–20. 
30 Ibid., 13.  
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B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
One independent variable alone cannot account for the complex dependent 
variable of violence rates within a society, but the question is whether one or more 
independent variables might best explain violence in Central America. The three most 
pertinent explanations for elevated violence levels applied to Central America are 
structuralist economic explanations, institutionalist approaches, and rational choice 
criminology theory. These approaches constitute the most plausible theories that are also 
testable from a national security affairs perspective. Evaluating hypotheses that rely on 
theories like constructivism, psychological criminology theory, and sociological 
criminology theory in Central America would extend beyond the feasibility of this thesis; 
collecting and analyzing relevant data would require both technical training and in-
country access beyond my purview. 
1. Structural Economic Hypothesis 
 Structuralists who study Central America often criticize recent economic history 
in the region and, in particular, the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank. Nevertheless, most detractors fail to describe precise causal linkages 
between neoliberal reforms and violence; often, scholars use neoliberalism as a general 
structural problem and assume, without offering evidence, that these reforms have 
exacerbated violence rates. As such, assessing precise structural economic correlations or 
causes of violence rates would fill a key gap in the scholarship. Structural economic 
explanations fall into one of two hypotheses centering on the variables of poverty and 
inequality respectively. 
 H1: The first structural hypothesis correlates violence with poverty. If higher 
poverty rates result in more violence, countries with higher poverty rates should exhibit 
higher homicide rates. The presence of low homicide rates alongside high poverty rates 
would call this hypothesis into question.  
 H2: The second structural hypothesis correlates violence with economic 
inequality. For this hypothesis to be true for Central America, countries with more 
 8 
economic inequality should exhibit higher homicide rates. On the other hand, an 
economically unequal country with low homicide rates would challenge this hypothesis. 
2. Institutionalist Hypothesis 
Institutionalist perspectives often link elevated violence rates with the dysfunction 
of state institutions, particularly security institutions like military, police, and intelligence 
agencies. Some common problems associated with Central American institutions are 
corruption, the influence of narco-trafficking organizations, the effect of recent conflicts, 
and the role of foreign interventionism. The scholarship using this theoretical approach is 
rich, but some areas ripe for exploration remain from a historical institutionalist 
perspective, particularly with respect to the development of state institutions during civil 
war and democratic transition periods. 
 H3: If security institutions are underfunded, inadequately staffed, lacking 
appropriate mandates, or otherwise impaired, then institutionalists would expect to see 
higher homicide rates. The existence of low violence rates in a country with poor 
institutions would challenge this argument. Conversely, institutionalists contend that 
well-funded, functioning institutions cause violence rates to decrease. If a country with 
functioning institutions has high homicide rates, this hypothesis would be challenged.  
3. Rational Choice Criminology Hypothesis 
 Finally, rational choice criminology theory examines the effect of state laws and 
government policies on the outcome of violence rates, with the inference that individuals 
make choices to commit or refrain from violence based on the efficacy and enforcement 
of these laws and policies—particularly those pertaining to policing, prosecution, and 
rehabilitation.  
 H4: According to the rational choice criminology hypothesis, higher homicide 
rates should correlate with ineffective, inadequate, or counterproductive government 
approaches and policies. Contrarily, sound policies and laws would be associated with 
lower homicide rates. Challenging this hypothesis would be evidence of a country with 
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sound government approaches but high violence rates, or the evidence of a country with 
low violence rates and also unsound government approaches.  
 These three hypothetical explanations are not mutually exclusive but do merit 
exploration individually to determine what ways they are applicable to Central America. 
One hypothesis might emerge as causally more significant, or alternatively each might 
contribute to the problem in different but equally important ways. A third outcome could 
be that one or more factors plays an enabling role, such that policies designed to address 
that particular shortcoming would most effectively ameliorate the problem of violence in 
Central America. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A comparative case study between El Salvador and Nicaragua offers the most 
useful mechanism to analyze the three hypothetical explanations for the causes of 
violence in Central America. The design fits in the category described by John Gerring as 
“the most-similar method” that “looks for a few cases that are as similar as possible in all 
respects except the outcome of interest, where they are expected to vary.”31 Nicaragua 
and El Salvador share enough relevant attributes to enable what Alexander George and 
Andrew Bennett refer to as “theory testing” to “assess the validity and scope conditions 
of single or competing theories,” in this case structuralism, institutionalism, and rational 
choice criminology theory.32 Moreover, the contrast of Nicaragua and El Salvador aligns 
with George and Bennett’s description of “heuristic case studies” that use “‘deviant’ or 
‘outlier’ cases” to “help uncover causal mechanisms” and “inductively identify new 
variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths.”33 El Salvador and 
Nicaragua are at opposite extremes of violence measured by homicide rates within 
Central America. In 2015, El Salvador’s homicide rate was the highest in the Western 
                                                 
 31 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 209–10. 
 32 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2004), 75.  
 33 Ibid.  
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Hemisphere, at 103 per 100,000 inhabitants.34 To the contrary, as indicated previously, 
Nicaragua has Central America’s lowest homicide rate. As such, the approach also aligns 
with what Gerring calls the “extreme-case method” that “exalts the criterion of variation 
to the point of being the principal feature of research design” in the hopes of “elucidating 
the mechanism at work in a causal relationship.”35 Contrasting Nicaragua and El 
Salvador thus offers a useful method of assessing the most plausible hypotheses outlined 
above.  
Nicaragua and El Salvador share enough key attributes to enable focus to remain 
primarily on the independent variables at question. Both are geographically situated so as 
to be “bridge states” for narcotics traffickers from South America.36 This shared feature 
negates the importance of geography as a structural cause and allows focus on other 
variables. Another key similarity is that both Nicaragua and El Salvador endured a 
violent period of civil unrest during the 1980s. This shared variable allows for a fruitful 
examination from a historical institutionalist perspective, specifically with respect to how 
state and security institutions developed during civil war periods. Structurally and 
economically, both rank in the bottom half of the 2013 Human Development Index, with 
El Salvador at 115 and Nicaragua at 132 out of 187.37 The similar levels of relative 
economic deprivation allow for an analysis of two countries with similar structural 
challenges, while simultaneously not excluding the possibility of key structural 
differences. 
The differences between El Salvador and Nicaragua are reflective of elements in 
Central America as a whole. One variable concerns the nature of state development and, 
specifically, the method of institutional development prior to the democratic transition. 
Nicaragua overthrew a repressive authoritarian regime and security apparatus before its 
civil war, whereas El Salvador’s state retained authoritarian and repressive institutions 
                                                 
 34 Gagne, “InSight Crime 2015 Homicide Round-up.” 
 35 Gerring, Social Science Methodology, 217.  
36 Bunck and Fowler, Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation, 384. 
 37 “Human Development Index (HDI),” UNDP Human Development Reports, last modified 
November 15, 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi-table.  
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prior to its democratic transition in the war period. Another divergent feature between the 
two countries is the role of foreign influence in each state. The U.S. supported El 
Salvador’s government and military with hundreds of millions of dollars and significant 
human capital during the 1980s, while the U.S. actively opposed the Sandinistas in power 
in Nicaragua.38 Finally, on a structural note, the two countries have historically had 
disparate levels of social inequality. As of 2013, El Salvador’s Gini coefficient was 
higher than Nicaragua’s by about eight points, 48.3 to 40.5.39 This divergence offers 
room to explore the structural economic correlation with the variance in violence rates. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The question of how to measure violence is fundamental to this analysis. Levels 
of general criminality are difficult to measure in Latin America due to the existence of 
what Mark Ungar calls the “cifra negra (black figure)” that results in up to 80 percent of 
crimes going unreported in many states throughout the region.40 The most reliable metric 
for measuring criminality and violence levels is the homicide rate, since these are most 
reliably reported and tracked not only by governments, but also by NGOs and 
international agencies.41 The thesis accordingly relies on homicide rates as the main 
indicator of violence levels in each country. 
The sources I use will vary depending on the hypothetical approach. For structural 
economic analysis, the most useful sources will be from various economic monitoring 
organizations and institutes, especially those that provide detailed rankings on various 
key macro- and microeconomic indicators. For the examination of historical institutional 
development, I will use primary documents—including declassified reports, government 
documents, news reports, memoirs, and more—as well as secondary scholarly sources 
written about the events. Other methods to evaluate institutional performance include 
                                                 
38 Booth et al., Understanding Central America, 347. 
 39 “Income Gini coefficient,” United Nations Development Programme, last modified November 15, 
2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient.  
 40 Mark Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 48–49. 
41 Ibid., 49–50.  
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regional polling organizations like the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 
that give insight into attitudes and perceptions of institutions. For the examination of 
rational choice theory, I will rely on primary and secondary sources that detail 
government approach and policies, as well as statistics and other metrics that might 
reveal correlations between policies and violence rates. 
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II. EVALUATING THE STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC 
HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter evaluates the first of the three hypotheses I will examine in this 
thesis: the structural economic hypothesis. At the heart of the structural economic 
hypothesis is the argument that individuals in poorer and less equal societies commit a 
higher quantity of violent crime. In examining the reasons for violence in Central 
America, academics, think tanks, and organizations like the United Nations frequently 
correlate high levels of poverty and inequality with higher violent crime rates.42 Some 
argue that poor economic conditions create structural conditions for violence to flourish. 
Booth et al. ascribe to neoliberalism the failures of equitable social distribution and argue 
that inequality has fueled class conflict and undermined state institutions.43 The UNODC 
devotes a section of its report on Central America to the poverty and inequality 
hypothesis.44 In a recent article about El Salvador, Strategic Forecasting, Inc. 
(STRATFOR) identifies poverty and structural economic problems as one of the factors 
behind El Salvador’s rapidly escalating homicide rates.45 The prevalence of these 
arguments—in many cases as an implicit assumption in the academic literature analyzing 
problems in Central America today—makes evaluating the structural economic 
hypothesis all the more important. 
The question driving this chapter, then, is as follows: How do economic poverty 
and inequality correlate with violence rates in Central America? To offer the most 
rigorous assessment of the poverty and inequality variables, this chapter widens the scope 
of case studies to include the six main countries in the region: Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. The chapter is divided into four sections. 
The first section offers definitions and an explanation of violence metrics used in this 
                                                 
42 Leggett, “Crime and Development in Central America,” 26–29. 
 43 John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America: 
Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015), 67.  
 44 Leggett, “Crime and Development in Central America,” 26–29.  
 45 “El Salvador: Bleak Prospects in the Face of Criminal Violence,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 
Feb 9, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/el-salvador-bleak-prospects-face-criminal-violence.  
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chapter. In the second section, I use economic data and country rankings to evaluate the 
hypothesis that higher poverty correlates with elevated violence rates. The third section 
assesses the inequality hypothesis using a similar methodology. The final section consists 
of conclusions and observations.  
The chapter’s findings result in a nuanced assessment of the structural economic 
hypothesis’s validity and have significant policy implications. Panama, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and Guatemala align with the predicted outcomes vis-à-vis most poverty and 
inequality indicators, while El Salvador and Nicaragua routinely diverge. The 
hypothesis’s inapplicability in two important cases—Nicaragua and El Salvador—
suggests that ameliorating poverty and inequality may not be the most effective or 
immediate solution to violence. The chapter’s findings are significant because of the 
prevalence of structural economic hypotheses in the literature for both diagnosing 
problems and prescribing solutions for violence the region. Subsequent chapters will 
examine the validity of two of the most common additional explanations for violence in 
Central America—rational choice criminology and institutionalist hypotheses—
pertaining to the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua, a case selection validated in this 
chapter due to their consistent deviation from the structural economic hypothesis’s 
predicted outcome.  
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
1. Definitions 
Before testing the hypothesis, it is first necessary to establish how this chapter 
defines the hypothesis’s two core concepts: poverty and inequality. Poverty can be 
defined in both relative and absolute terms. An absolute measure of poverty has been 
established by the World Bank, which uses $1.90 per day as a threshold below which one 
is considered to live in poverty.46 Relative or indirect measures of poverty include gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, unemployment, literacy, and education rates. 
Similarly, both absolute and relative measurements pertain to inequality. For inequality, 
                                                 
 46 “Poverty & Equity Data,” World Bank, accessed March 8, 2016, 
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/home/.  
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this chapter uses the Gini Index as the commonly accepted best absolute measurement. 
Indirect indicators of inequality include evaluations of the microeconomic climate’s 
ability to foster social mobility. To this end, two reputable indices are the Index of 
Economic Freedom and the Ease of Doing Business Index. Other indirect indicators of 
inequality include the Human Opportunity Index, which measures access to basic public 
goods, and the Corruption Perceptions Index, which offers an indirect measure of how 
well institutions enable access to public goods.  
2. Violence Metrics 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, the most reliable metric for measuring 
criminality and violence levels is the homicide rate, since these statistics are most reliably 
reported and tracked not only by governments, but also by NGOs and international 
agencies.47 Figure 1 depicts the upward trend in homicide rates in the crime-plagued 
countries of the Northern Triangle, which includes Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras from 1990 to 2010. 
                                                 
47 Ungar, Policing Democracy, 49–50.  
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Figure 1.  Homicide Rates in Central America, 1990–2010 (per 100,000 
Inhabitants)48 
Since 2010, El Salvador’s rate has continued its upward trend, whereas that of 
Honduras and Guatemala has experienced a downward move. Figure 2 displays the 
current data for the six countries in Central America on which this inquiry focuses. As of 
2015, El Salvador is projected to have the highest homicide rate in the region, at 92 per 
100,000 inhabitants.49 Honduras and Guatemala come in second and third behind El 
Salvador, followed by Panama, Costa Rica, and finally Nicaragua with the lowest rate.  
                                                 
 48 Source: Cruz, “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America,” 4. 
 49 Jonathan Watts, “One Murder Every Hour: How El Salvador Became the Homicide Capital of the 




Figure 2.  Homicide Rates in Central America, 2015 (per 100,000 Inhabitants)50 
B. ANALYSIS OF POVERTY AND VIOLENCE CORRELATIONS 
 This section assesses the hypothesis that correlates higher poverty rates with 
higher violent crime rates—or, for this chapter, homicide rates as the most reliable 
indicator of violence—using both absolute and relative, or indirect, measurements of 
poverty. The absolute measurement of poverty is the World Bank’s definition of poverty 
as a person living off of less than $1.90 per day. For the relative measurements of 
poverty, this section uses GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), 
unemployment, education, and literacy. Each of these indirect indicators reflects socio-
economic factors that tend to keep individuals in poverty—or at least confound their 
economic advancement.  
For each indicator, the structural economic hypothesis would predict that 
indicators of greater poverty should correlate with higher homicide rates. To achieve a 
perfect correlation in GDP per capita, for instance, all countries would have to be ranked 
in inverse order with their ranking by homicide rates, with the lowest homicide rate 
country having the highest GDP per capita, the next lowest homicide rate country having 
the second highest GDP per capita, and so on.  
 
                                                 
 50 Adapted from Gagne, “InSight Crime 2015 Homicide Round-up.” 








1. Poverty in Absolute Terms: Less than $1.90 per Day 
As discussed above, the World Bank defines poverty as living with less than 
$1.90 per day. As Figure 3 indicates, higher levels of poverty generally correlate with 
higher violence rates, with two exceptions. Costa Rica and Panama have two of the 
region’s the lowest poverty rates, which correlate with their lower poverty levels. On the 
other hand, Honduras and Guatemala have two of the highest rates of poverty, which 
correlate with higher violent crime rates.  
 
Figure 3.   Poverty Rates Compared with Homicide Rates by Country in Central 
America (World Bank)51  
The data in Figure 3 reveals two divergences from the outcome predicted by the 
poverty hypothesis: El Salvador and Nicaragua. El Salvador has one of the lowest 
poverty rates in Central America, a fact that should, under the poverty hypothesis, 
correlate with lower violent crime rates. In El Salvador, just over 3 percent of the 
population lives in poverty, but the country has the region’s highest homicide rate. 
Conversely, Nicaragua’s poverty rate, more than 10 percent of the population, is 
approximately equal to Guatemala’s, but its homicide rate is the lowest in the region.52 In 
                                                 
51 Adapted from “Poverty & Equity: Regional Dashboard, Latin America & Caribbean,” World Bank, 
accessed March 15, 2016. http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/LAC; Gagne, “InSight Crime 2015 
Homicide Round-up.” 
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absolute terms, the percentage of the population living in poverty is more than three times 
greater in Nicaragua than in El Salvador, yet the former has a dramatically lower level of 
violence. For the other countries, the results more or less align with the hypothesis’s 
predicted outcome. Low-poverty Costa Rica and Panama have among the region’s lowest 
homicide rates, while high-poverty Guatemala and Honduras have higher homicide rates. 
2. GDP per Capita (PPP) 
GDP per capita adjusted for PPP offers a way to measure levels of prosperity of 
countries against each other. According to the hypothesis that correlates poverty with 
elevated violence rates, lower GDP per capita should correlate with higher homicide 
rates. Figure 4 presents a comparison of homicide rates with GDP per capita (PPP).  
 
Figure 4.  GDP per Capita (PPP) Compared with Homicide Rates by Country in 
Central America (World Bank)53 
 As Figure 4 shows, the correlation between this indirect indicator of poverty and 
homicide rates holds with the same two divergences: El Salvador and Nicaragua. The 
countries that align with the predicted outcome are the same as previously. Panama and 
                                                 
 53 GDP data adapted from “GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $),” World Bank, 
accessed February 20, 2016. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD; homicide rate data 
adapted from Gagne, “InSight Crime 2015 Homicide Round-up.” 
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Costa Rica have the highest GDP per capita (PPP) and among the lowest homicide rates, 
whereas the converse is true for Guatemala and Honduras. On the other hand, the 
hypothesis would predict that Nicaragua should have the region’s highest GDP per 
capita. Instead, Nicaragua, however, has the region’s lowest GDP per capita and still one 
of the lowest homicide rates, while El Salvador has the third highest GDP per capita but 
by far the highest homicide rate. For these two cases, the correlation is thus significantly 
different from the expected outcome; indeed, the data shows the reverse of what would 
be expected.  
3. Unemployment Rates 
 If the structural economic argument were valid, higher rates of unemployment 
would correlate with higher violence rates. Scholars such as Richard McGahey argue that 
unemployment and the lack of social mobility are drivers to delinquency, especially for 
young adult males.54 The data in Central America, however, reveals no such direct 
correlation. As Figure 5 indicates, the countries with the lowest unemployment rates for 
the past five years in Central America include Guatemala and Honduras, two of the three 
countries with the highest homicide rates. On the other end of the spectrum, Costa Rica—
which has Central America’s second lowest homicide rate—has had the highest 
unemployment rate for the past five years. It should be noted that the unemployment 
metric alone cannot account for the nuances involved in employment, particularly the 
quality of employment and levels of underemployment not reflected in this data. 
Nevertheless, unemployment data offers value as a standard and widely regarded measure 
of economic performance—one that reveals no clear correlation with violence rates. 
                                                 
54 McGahey, “Economic Conditions, Neighborhood Organization, and Urban Crime,” 231.  
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Figure 5.  Unemployment Rate by Country in Central America (World Bank)55 
4. Education and Literacy Rates 
According to the World Bank, “Education is one of the most powerful 
instruments for reducing poverty and inequality and lays a foundation for sustained 
economic growth.”56 Advocates of the poverty hypothesis would argue that lack of 
education and literacy diminishes the potential for employment and social mobility in 
modern economies and thus acts as an indirect cause of poverty and higher crime rates. 
As Figure 6 indicates, Costa Rica and Panama have the region’s highest education and 
literacy rates, and also among the lowest homicide rates (see Figure 2 above). Costa Rica 
and Panama have significantly higher secondary education participation rates than the 
more violent countries of Guatemala and Honduras, whose lower education rates 
correlate with higher violence levels.  
Once again, however, Nicaragua and El Salvador show divergences from the 
pattern. Per the data below, Nicaragua has the region’s second lowest secondary school 
participation rate, at 45%, and also the region’s lowest youth male literacy rate, at 85%. 
Nevertheless, Nicaragua’s homicide rates are the region’s lowest at 8 per 100,000 as of 
                                                 
 55 Adapted from “Unemployment, total (% of total labor force),” World Bank, accessed February 18, 
2016. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS.  



















2015, per Figure 2. El Salvador, on the other hand, has the region’s third highest youth 
literacy and secondary education rate, behind Costa Rica and Panama, but remains the 
most violent country, with a homicide rate of 103 per 100,000 per Figure 2. Here again 
the data shows that indicators of poverty do not correlate with lower levels of violence 
for these two countries.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Education and Literacy in Central America57 
 
                                                 
57 Adapted from “Information by Country and Programme,” UNICEF, accessed March 10, 2016, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry.  
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5. Poverty and Violence: Conclusions and Observations  
 Table 1 summarizes the findings of the data used to evaluate the structural 
economic hypothesis pertaining to the variable of poverty. For four of the six countries 
analyzed, the hypothesis more or less correlates with the violence outcomes in each 
country. Low-violence countries like Costa Rica and Panama mostly fall in line with the 
hypothesis’s predicted outcome. Indicators of poverty levels, GDP per capita, literacy, and 
school participation all place the two countries at the top of the region’s ranking for wealth 
and prosperity. Likewise, Honduras and Guatemala—at the higher and middle range of 
regional violence levels, respectively—have poverty data that correlate with the 
hypothesis’s predicted outcome. Honduras, with the region’s second highest homicide rate, 
has high poverty levels, low GDP per capita, and one of the lowest secondary school 
participation rates. Guatemala, with the third highest homicide rate, has middling rankings 
pertaining to several poverty indicators, in line with what the hypothesis would predict.  





























Medium High High Medium 103 
Honduras High Low Low High High Low 57 
Guatemala Medium Mediu
m 
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Panama Low High Low High High Medium 11 
Nicaragua Medium Low Medium Medium High Low 8 
 
Nevertheless, Nicaragua and El Salvador stand out as clear divergences from the 
hypothesis’s expected outcome. Regionally, Nicaragua has above-average poverty levels, 
low GDP per capita, medium unemployment, and low secondary school participation, 
                                                 
58 Homicide rate data adapted from Gagne, “InSight Crime 2015 Homicide Round-up.” 
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and yet its homicide rate is the lowest in Central America. If the hypothesis were 
accurate, however, the poverty data suggests that Nicaragua should have one of the 
region’s highest homicide rates. On the contrary, El Salvador has low poverty levels, 
medium GDP per capita, medium unemployment, and medium secondary school 
participation, but its homicide levels are by far the highest. In contrast to the data, the 
hypothesis predicts that El Salvador should have a low or moderate level of violence 
based on poverty indicators. 
The divergence of Nicaragua and El Salvador not only validates the thesis’s 
overarching case selection, it also raises a question with important potential policy 
implications: Why and how have Nicaragua and El Salvador so strongly deviated from 
the expected outcome? If other regional countries adhere to the hypothesis’s expected 
outcome, the most likely explanation is that other variables outweigh the effect of poverty 
in these cases. The findings suggest that poverty is generally an important indicator of 
violence, but other variables—like those to be examined in subsequent chapters—can 
override the importance of poverty.  
C. ANALYSIS OF INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE CORRELATIONS 
This section evaluates the second part of the structural economic hypothesis, 
which correlates higher economic inequality with higher levels of violent crime. To 
assess this argument, this section again uses both direct and indirect measurements of 
inequality. For the direct measurement of inequality, the Gini index offers the most 
suitable tool for contrasting the various countries in Central America. The indirect 
measurements of inequality consist of standard microeconomic indicators that evaluate 
how well or poorly state institutions provide basic public goods, govern efficiently, and 
allow for equality of opportunity for economic advancement. To derive these indirect 
indicators, I use data from the Human Opportunity Index, the Index of Economic 
Freedom, Ease of Doing Business rankings, and Corruption Perceptions Index.  
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1. Absolute Measurement of Inequality: Gini Index 
Figure 7 depicts the Gini coefficient by country in Central America alongside a 
measure of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants; a higher Gini coefficient indicates greater 
levels of inequality. 
 
Figure 7.   Homicide Rates and Gini Coefficients59 
The findings generally support the hypothesis’s contention that greater inequality 
should correlate with higher homicide rates, with the sole exception of El Salvador. 
Honduras has the highest Gini coefficient and also has the region’s highest homicide rate 
excluding El Salvador. On the other end of the spectrum, Nicaragua has both the lowest 
Gini coefficient and the lowest homicide rate. Other countries fall into place with 
homicide rates ranked in the same order as Gini coefficient. Nevertheless, the exception 
of El Salvador demonstrates that the hypothesis does not achieve a perfect correlation. 
The divergence of El Salvador is particularly significant due to its flagrance: El Salvador 
is the second most equal country but still has, by far, the highest homicide rate. The case 
of El Salvador suggests that, as with poverty indicators above, other variables must be at 
work to cause a divergence from the hypothesis’s predicted outcome. Another 
                                                 
 59 Adapted from “Income Gini Coefficient,” UNDP Human Development Reports, UNDP, last 
modified November 15, 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient; Gagne, “InSight Crime 












complication for the hypothesis is that two countries with very small differences in Gini 
coefficients can have disproportionately large homicide rate discrepancies. For instance, 
the difference between Honduras’ and Guatemala’s Gini coefficients is only 1.1 or a 
difference of only 2 percent, while Honduras has almost double the homicide rate.  
2. Inequality and Access to Public Goods: The Human Opportunity 
Index 
The Human Opportunity Index was developed, according to Javier Reyes and W. 
Charles Sawyer, as “an attempt at quantifying equality of opportunity in Latin America,” 
specifically by measuring children’s access to sanitation, water, education, housing, 
electricity, and Internet.60 Figure 8 shows each country’s results with the exception of 
Panama, for which no data is available. 
 
Figure 8.  Human Opportunity Index in Central America (Circa 2011)61 
Assuming the Human Opportunity Index accurately reflects conditions that lead 
to economic inequality, the inequality hypothesis would postulate that lower index scores 
should correlate with higher homicide rates. The results are mixed. Costa Rica, a low 
                                                 
 60 Javier A. Reyes and W. Charles Sawyer, Latin American Economic Development (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 386. 
 61 Adapted from “Visualize Inequality: Latin American & Caribbean: Coverage Maps,” World Bank, 
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crime country, has a clearly superior ranking in each of the three categories. 
Nevertheless, Nicaragua—with the region’s lowest homicide rate—should have among 
the highest percentages in each category, if the hypothesis were correct. Instead, 
Nicaragua ranks roughly equivalent to Honduras, a country with the second highest 
homicide rate, in access to these basic goods. Conversely, the country with the highest 
homicide rate, El Salvador, has the lowest percentages of children with access to clean 
water and basic sanitation, but the second highest percentage with access to electricity. 
Honduras and Guatemala, which have the region’s second and third highest homicide 
rates, have scores higher than El Salvador in two categories (access to sanitation and 
water), and lower in the category of access to electricity. The Human Opportunity Index 
thus reveals mixed results for the hypothesized correlation between inequality indicators 
and violence, with Nicaragua emerging as the most pronounced divergence from the 
expected outcome. The divergence implies the existence of other variables in Nicaragua 
that cause it to depart from general regional correlations between this indicator of 
inequality and violence. 
3. Inequality and the Microeconomic Environment: Economic Freedom 
As Reyes and Sawyer contend, in a society that promotes economic 
egalitarianism, the regulation of business must be accomplished using means that do not 
impede equality of opportunity.62 One indirect indicator that pertains to inequality is thus 
the assurance of a competitive free market, namely through institutions that support 
economic freedom, equality of opportunity, and the encouragement of economic growth. 
The Heritage Foundation ranks countries’ institutions based on four categories that 
evaluate how well they promote an environment conducive to citizens freely pursuing 
their economic wellbeing. The four categories are rule of law, limited government, 
regulatory efficiency, and open markets. Figure 9 displays the results of each country’s 
overall score within the ranking system. 
                                                 
62 Reyes and Sawyer, Latin American Economic Development, 396.  
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Figure 9.   Index of Economic Freedom Rankings (Heritage Foundation)63 
The findings show a general positive correlation between this indirect gauge of 
inequality and violence. Less violent Costa Rica and Panama score highest in the region, 
while more violent Guatemala and Honduras score near the bottom. Nevertheless, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua once again diverge from the hypothesis’s predicted outcome. El 
Salvador has the second highest economic freedom ranking in Central America, but it is 
by far the region’s most violent country as measured by homicide rates. On the other end 
of the spectrum, Nicaragua has the region’s lowest homicide rate but the region’s second 
lowest economic freedom ranking. The divergences of Nicaragua and El Salvador are 
reminiscent of the results of the poverty section above. As before, the data suggests that 
other variables—to be examined in subsequent chapters—might supersede the economic 
variables with respect to violence outcomes in these two cases. 
                                                 
63 Adapted from “2016 Index of Economic Freedom,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed March 21, 
2016, http://www.heritage.org/index/.  
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4. Inequality and Microeconomic Climate: Ease of Doing Business 
Another indirect indicator relevant to inequality measures how well a country’s 
microeconomic climate affords equality of access to social mobility through 
entrepreneurship. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index measures how well 
“the regulatory environment is conducive to business operation.”64 In this index, 
countries with lower numerical rankings have better business environments, from 1 to 
189. As Table 2 indicates, Costa Rica has the best business environment in Central 
America at a ranking of 58, and Nicaragua has the worst ranking at 125. El Salvador 
ranks near the regional mean at 86.  
Table 2.   Ease of Doing Business Ranking (1 to 189 with 1 as Highest), 201565 
Country Ranking 
Costa Rica 58 
Panama 69 
Guatemala 81 




Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, and Honduras fall into rankings that parallel 
their position as ranked by homicide rates. Costa Rica and Panama, which are tied for the 
region’s second lowest homicide rate, are ranked in the top two for best business 
environments. On the contrary, Honduras has the region’s second highest homicide rate 
and the second worst business environment. Nicaragua starkly diverges from the 
                                                 
64 “Ease of Doing Business Index,” World Bank, accessed March 18, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ. 
 65 Adapted from “Ease of Doing Business Index.” 
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expected outcome, however, with the region’s worst business environment but the lowest 
homicide rate. El Salvador has a regionally average business environment but the highest 
homicide rate. As with other indicators, this indirect indicator of inequality correlates 
with homicide rates with the important exclusions of El Salvador and Nicaragua. Another 
instance of divergence of these two countries adds to the likelihood that other non-
economic variables are overriding the structural economic hypothesis’s predicted 
correlation with violence levels. 
5. Inequality and Corruption: Corruption Perceptions Index 
Corruption often results in an insidious cronyism that favors those with ties to 
government officials rather than creating a competitive microeconomic climate in which 
individuals have equal access to goods and social advancement. Levels of corruption can 
thus be an indirect indicator of inequality, since more corrupt societies tend to be more 
highly stratified in access to economic and public goods. Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index is one of the most common indices that ranks each country 
in the world, as its website states, “on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).”66 
Figure 10 shows the scores of each Central American country analyzed in this chapter. 
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Figure 10.   Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Scores, 
201567 
As Figure 10 indicates, El Salvador and Nicaragua once again stand out as the 
exceptions to the correlation between this indirect indicator of inequality and homicide 
rates. Costa Rica and Panama once again fall at the high end of the rankings, as 
hypothesis predicts given their low homicide rates, while Guatemala and Honduras rank 
near the bottom in accordance with the hypothesis. Nicaragua, however, is ranked as the 
most corrupt country despite the least violent country in Central America. Moreover, El 
Salvador ranks near the top—roughly equal to Panama—in spite of having the region’s 
highest homicide rate, a ranking that contradicts the hypothesis’s predicted outcome. 
Again the implication is that other variables must be at work in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador that transcend the impact of corruption as an indirect indicator of inequality. 
6. Inequality and Violence: Conclusions and Observations   
Table 3 below summarizes the results of the data in this section. As with the 
previous section’s poverty indicators, four of six Central American republics more or less 
align with the hypothesis’s predicted outcome, but the same two exceptions emerge: 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. Costa Rica and Panama emerge as countries with lower 
levels of inequality, an outcome that correlates with their low homicide rates. More 
violent Honduras and Guatemala score worse in every indicator of inequality, thus 
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correlating with the hypothesis’s predicted outcome. Both have high Gini coefficients, 
medium access to basic goods, and high levels of perceived corruption. Between the two, 
Honduras scores lower than Guatemala in economic freedom and business environment 
indicators, which correlates with its comparatively higher homicide rate.  
Nicaragua and El Salvador clearly deviate from the hypothesis’s predicted 
outcome. El Salvador has a low level of inequality, high economic freedom rankings, and 
medium rankings for business environment and perceived corruption levels. The only 
correlating indicator is the human opportunity index, in which El Salvador scores poorly. 
Given this data set, the hypothesis would predict El Salvador to have low or moderate 
levels of violence, in contrast to the actual extremely high levels of violence. Nicaragua 
deviates from the predicted outcome in the opposite manner. With the exception of the 
Gini Index, Nicaragua has poor rankings in each of the inequality indicators: limited 
access to basic goods, poor economic freedom rankings, a low-ranking business 
environment, and high levels of perceived corruption. Nevertheless, Nicaragua is the least 
violent Central American republic, a contradiction of the hypothesis’s predicted outcome, 
which would expect Nicaragua to be among the most violent countries. 
Table 3.   Summary of Findings: Inequality Indicators and Rankings68 




















El Salvador Low Low High Medium Medium 103 
Honduras High Medium Low Low High 57 
Guatemala High Medium Medium Medium High 30 
Costa Rica Medium High High High Low 11 
Panama Medium N/A High High Medium 11 
Nicaragua Low Low Low Low High 8 
                                                 
68 Homicide rate data adapted from Gagne, “InSight Crime 2015 Homicide Round-up.” 
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D. CONCLUSIONS: ASSESSING THE STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC 
HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter evaluated the hypothesis that violence in Central America correlates 
with poverty and inequality. Tables 1 and 3 above summarize the findings for each 
indicator for both the poverty and inequality aspects of the hypothesis. The data broadly 
confirms the structural economic hypothesis’s predicted correlations with violence 
outcomes in four of the six countries: Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala. 
Indicators of poverty and inequality in these countries generally correlated with violence 
levels as measured by homicide rates. The section also revealed recurring deviations of El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. Highly violent El Salvador emerged as one of the wealthier and 
more equal Central American republics, while the data showed Nicaragua, the region’s 
least violent country, to be one of the poorest and, with the exception of the Gini Index, 
one of the more challenged with respect to economic equality.  
The findings do two important things. First, they corroborate the case selection of 
Nicaragua and El Salvador as the central cases for examination in subsequent chapters. 
Second, the findings confirm that, although structural economic variables of poverty and 
inequality correlate with violence outcomes in several regional countries, structural 
economic variables are not preeminent. These findings set the stage for an examination of 
what other variables might be superseding the economic variables in these two outlier 
cases. Moreover, the important deviations of Nicaragua and El Salvador should signal to 
policymakers that alleviating poverty and inequality—though laudable goals in their own 
right—might not be the most effective method of reducing violence rates. As the cases of 
Nicaragua and El Salvador imply, policymakers should be ready to explore alternate 
causes beyond structural economic variables, a task to which the present inquiry turns in 
the next chapter. 
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III. EVALUATING THE RATIONAL CHOICE CRIMINOLOGY 
HYPOTHESIS 
This section assesses the second of three hypotheses pertaining to the problem of 
violence in Central America: the rational choice criminology hypothesis. This hypothesis 
contends that internal security policies and approaches correlate with violence outcomes. 
According to the hypothesis, sophisticated and robust internal security policies and 
approaches reduce violence rates, whereas the absence of sound policies results in higher 
rates. This argument is based on the theory’s contention that individuals choose to 
commit violent crimes with greater frequency in countries with states that fail to 
effectively deter, prosecute, or otherwise ascribe costs to the choice to commit such 
crimes. Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter narrows the focus to a comparative case 
study of Nicaragua and El Salvador, with the aim of drawing out conclusions relevant to 
the region as a whole. To do so, I evaluate internal security policies and approaches in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador through the rational choice criminology paradigm and so test 
validity of the hypothesis. As shall become clear in this chapter, I find credible evidence 
to support the contention that effective internal security strategies and approaches 
correlate with violent crime outcomes in the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador.  
To this end, this chapter will proceed as follows. The first part of the chapter uses 
a historical analysis of security policy development during each country’s recent history 
of civil conflict. This historical background offers insight into how divergent 
development paths have resulted in differing security sector approaches and policies. To 
examine how each state’s security approaches developed, I review relevant scholarly 
literature, other pertinent secondary sources, and relevant primary sources like 
declassified embassy cables and intelligence reports.  
The second part of the chapter establishes a framework for testing the rational 
choice criminology hypothesis, as well as for defining what constitutes effective security 
policies and approaches. The framework and definition draws from Ungar’s Policing 
Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America, as well as Tim 
Prenzler’s anthology Policing and Security in Practice: Challenges and Achievements. 
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The analysis centers on three indicators of internal security strategies that should, as the 
hypothesis and literature assert, deter violent outcomes: community involvement, 
intelligence gathering capabilities, and recidivism reduction programs.  
This chapter concludes by summarizing the analysis and findings. Nicaragua’s 
security policies and approaches—developed in a particular historical context—emerge 
as superior in each of the three categories, a fact that correlates with its dramatically 
lower violence rates and accords with the outcome predicted by the rational choice 
criminology hypothesis. 
A. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: ORIGINS OF INTERNAL SECURITY 
APPROACHES 
This section analyzes the security sector formation that took place during the 
turbulent periods of civil strife as the roots of current criminological approaches. The 
classical theory of the state articulated by Max Weber provides context for the analysis. 
Weber contends that the state must achieve “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory.”69 As implied by the rational choice criminology 
hypothesis, how a state establishes—or fails to secure—a legitimate monopoly of the use 
of force influences how effectively a state can counter, deter, and prevent threats to 
internal security. In both cases, how security sector policies and approaches developed 
during the civil war periods has shaped the subsequent criminological approaches of the 
internal security forces. The analysis begins with El Salvador and then turns to 
Nicaragua. 
Enrique Baloyra-Herp’s characterization of Central America provides context for 
my historical analysis. Baloyra-Herp observes that Central America during much the 20th 
century was characterized by the existence of “reactionary coalitions” that governed 
through despotism and authoritarian measures.70 The reactionary despotisms ruled with 
the aim of protecting an antiquated economic system based on export agriculture and a 
                                                 
 69 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, eds. Patrick H. 
O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), 40. 
70 Enrique Baloyra-Herp, “Reactionary Despotism in Central America,” Journal of Latin American 
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form of capitalism that benefited upper classes.71 As Baloyra-Herp argued in 1983, “the 
contemporary crises of El Salvador and Nicaragua are related to the deterioration of this 
form of political domination.”72 An ancillary theme in this section’s analysis is how the 
method and timing of displacing reactionary despotism influenced security sector 
development and approaches toward internal security. 
1. El Salvador  
During the civil war in El Salvador in the 1980s, the government functioned as 
what Fabrice LeHoucq characterizes as “a hybrid of democratic forms and authoritarian 
characteristics.”73 As LeHoucq aptly articulates, “Although civilians now participated in 
the executive and legislative branches of government, it was the military in association 
with the U.S. Embassy that made key decisions.”74 The U.S. government’s involvement 
centered on the goal of defeating the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN). El Salvador was in the throes of an active insurgency financed and supplied by 
Soviet bloc states. According to a declassified U.S. State Department cable from San 
Salvador in 1982, the FMLN was receiving covert assistance from the Cubans, Soviets, 
Vietnamese, North Koreans and Nicaraguans.75 Assistance primarily took the form of 
weapons and supplies delivered through various air, sea, and land routes.76 Guerillas in 
1982 numbered approximately 10,000, with a total of 50,000 sympathizers and 
supporters.77 The guerillas were not fighting a clean war. They not only conducted 
attacks against military targets, but they also excelled at “interdicting highways, bombing 
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buses, and attacks on the electrical system.”78 Academics who accuse the U.S. of 
unilateral interference and aggression in El Salvador ignore the context: communist states 
were actively supporting the FMLN, and many non-communists were struggling to 
defend their interests against radical guerillas.  
El Salvador has a history of close relations with the United States, which has 
served as its mainstay of foreign assistance, development aid, and political support for 
decades. The U.S. government initiated the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s, and from 
1962 to 1972 the U.S. spent hundreds of millions of dollars to support development, 
including the building of schools, the construction of ports, and other infrastructure 
projects in the Central America.79 U.S. aid to El Salvador grew exponentially in the 
1980s to support the government’s counterinsurgency against the FMLN. El Salvador 
received more than double the amount of foreign assistance between than any other 
Central American state between 1981 and 1992, for a total of $273 million for the 
military and $860 million in general economic aid.80  
Nevertheless, in the context of fighting a well-organized insurgency against the 
FMLN, the El Salvadoran government—with the assistance of the United States—
overlooked the development and implementation of sound criminological approaches. 
Many U.S. leaders felt they had no choice but to ignore grave violations on the part of El 
Salvador’s security forces, even when U.S. citizens were murdered. Two incidents 
highlight this reality. In 1980, four U.S. nuns were assassinated; in 1981, El Salvadoran 
officials directed, as Jack Spence notes, “the assassination of two U.S. citizens” and “the 
head of the Salvadoran agrarian reform agency.”81 Rather than demand an investigation 
of these crimes, or even stipulate conditions on further military assistance, senior military 
and civilian leaders in the U.S. government advocated for the dismissal of the cases and 
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increased foreign military assistance.
82 U.S. 
government position, as Spence contends, 
“was always compromised by its desire to avoid FMLN advances.”83  
Members of El Salvador’s military understood the vulnerability of the United 
States and exploited its unconditional assistance. As Spence points out, “They [El 
Salvador’s military] knew the U.S. needed them” and used this dependence to ensure 
their “impunity from the law.”84 The United States unwittingly helped foment impunity 
problems in the security forces in El Salvador. Rather than demand moral probity and 
adherence to the rule of law on the part of El Salvador’s government and military, the 
U.S. instructed security forces in methods of torture, harassment, intimidation, and 
repression. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight released 
a fact sheet in 1992 admitting that U.S. training manuals for El Salvador’s security forces 
contained language inconsistent with U.S. policies against torture.85 The following 
directive in the training manuals illustrates the point: “The CI agent could cause the arrest 
of the employee’s parents, imprison the employee or give him a beating as part of the 
placement plan of said employee in the guerrilla organization.”86 Human rights abuses in 
El Salvador during the 1980s were frequent and well documented.  
El Salvador’s security forces, by using any and all means necessary to defeat the 
threat posed by the FMLN, neglected the establishment of sound criminological 
approaches, which contrasts with Nicaragua’s experience in the 1980s, as shall become 
evident in the subsequent section. El Salvador’s police and military in the 1980s were 
totally engaged in a counterinsurgency against the FMLN that often failed to respect 
basic human rights, the building of relations with communities, and the development of 
sustainable policing practices. As a result of these particular sets of internal security 
habits, the UN-sponsored Peace Accords of 1992 prioritized reform of the security 
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institutions.87 The nature and scope of the reforms shall be examined more thoroughly in 
the next chapter, but here it suffices to mention that the accords’ focus on purification 
resulted from general dissatisfaction with repressive and unsustainable internal security 
approaches. Moreover, the accords sought to undertake a wholesale reinvention of 
internal security approaches through institutional purification rather than a positive vision 
of criminological and policing practices that had developed organically, for instance, in 
Nicaragua. As an example, per specific demands of the FMLN, the head of El Salvador’s 
newly created Civilian National Police (PNC) could have no ties to the previous security 
apparatus.88 The first director of the PNC, a businessman, had no prior police experience 
and consequently, had no experience on which to rely for the development of a security 
strategy.89 
After the Peace Accords, the police and military, though reformed, lacked an 
institutional history of sound criminological approaches, in contrast to its counterparts in 
Nicaragua. The explosion of gang violence began while the consolidation of El 
Salvador’s internal security approaches was still underway. El Salvador’s spastic and 
inconsistent policy responses—Mano Dura (firm hand), Super Mano Dura (extremely 
firm hand), and the feckless Mano Extendida (extended hand)—reflect the newly 
reformed security sector’s inability to draw from previous sound criminological 
approaches and the institutional architecture required to support them. On the contrary, 
Nicaragua, to which I turn now, had sound internal security approaches in place for over 
a decade prior to democratization and the onslaught of post-war security challenges.  
2. Nicaragua 
After overthrowing the repressive Anastasio Somoza regime in 1979, Nicaragua 
established a security model capable of withstanding the democratic transition without 
the need for drastic purges or radical doctrinal shifts. The consolidation of Nicaragua’s 
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security establishment began in the years following the 1979 Sandinista revolution. What 
made Nicaragua so ripe for revolutionary activity—one supported by an unusually broad 
coalition including Marxists, business elites, and Catholic clergy90—was the repressive 
and exploitative nature of Somoza’s reactionary despotism. Somoza, according to 
Beverly Carl, “used his position to make his family the wealthiest in Central America,” 
controlling up to 40 percent of the economy, monopolizing the fishing industry, and 
owning 20 percent of all arable land.91 Meanwhile much of the population lived on 
meager rations and lacked basic sanitation, running water, and income.92 In his memoirs, 
former U.S. Ambassador Frank McNeil relates how “it was the popular, across-the-board 
nature of the uprising that brought Somoza down.”93 Even Cardinal Miguel Obando y 
Bravo of Managua publicly criticized Somoza following Somoza’s corrupt 
misappropriation of disaster relief after the earthquake of 1972.94 The Sandinista 
transition away from a reactionary despotism marked a divergence from the path taken by 
the Northern Triangle states like El Salvador, which through the 1980s continued 
operating under varying degrees of reactionary authoritarianism.  
Cuban involvement in Nicaragua began as early as 1959, when future Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN) founder Carlos Fonseca traveled to Cuba and 
collaborated with Che Guevara, who initially sent Fonseca to Honduras for a brief but 
unsuccessful guerilla warfare campaign.95 In Somoza, Castro recognized a vulnerable 
U.S. ally and envisioned the FSLN as the vehicle for his removal, an outcome that 
became more urgent for Castro following the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 1954 
coup in Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.96 Cuba actively supported the 
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FSLN by providing training, materiel, and financing, including supporting incursions 
from Honduras into Nicaragua, as well as facilitating high-level prisoner exchanges; as 
Fonseca admitted in a 1970 interview, the FSLN decisively owed its continued existence 
to Cuba.97 The Cuban presence was extensive, according to a declassified CIA report 
from 1982:  
The total Cuban contingent is approximately 6,000. They are employed in 
a variety of areas: 500-medical; 2,100 primary teachers; 300–600 
government agencies; 100 secondary teachers; 750 construction/fishing; in 
addition to the 1,750 military/security advisors.98 
The break with Somoza’s structure of state security created an opportunity for 
new security structures in Nicaragua. A declassified U.S. Army Intelligence Survey of 
1984, produced by the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), contains a 
meticulous overview of how the security and defense establishment was formed in the 
years after the revolution. The most important aspect of the security regime after the 1979 
revolution was the creation of the Comités de Defensa Sandinista (CDS) (Sandinista 
defense committees). The CDS originated from the Comités de Defensa Civil (CDC) 
(Civil defense committees) established by the FSLN during the revolution in 1978. The 
CDS combined social services with public security. The CDS drew on Cuba’s model of 
local defense committees for “defending the revolution from ideological and political 
enemies, but also as a way of organizing the communities.”99 Membership in the CDS 
was diffuse and widespread. By 1986, membership in the CDS included 500,000 out of a 
total population of 3.5 million.100 The CDS were responsible for planning for 
catastrophes in the conflict, including securing food inventories, maintaining health care 
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supplies and clinics, securing clean water supply, and caring for the wounded.101 The 
organization became a focal point for the delivery of public goods, including “food, 
medicine, and other essentials in support of the massive relief effort needed to begin 
rebuilding the country.”102 At the same time, the CDS initially served as a means to 
identify and neutralize counterrevolutionaries.103 The FSLN created an echelon of 
“revolutionary guards” within the CDS specifically responsible for reporting on 
individuals to higher authorities.104 A U.S. Army intelligence report details, however, 
that in spite of initial fears the CDS actually operated with few reported cases of 
totalitarian abuse.105  
The Nicaraguan model of grassroots security has acted as a bulwark against the 
adoption of mano dura strategies that have characterized Northern Triangle states.106 The 
FSLN-dominated CDS were used as a means of promoting local participation in the 
creation of a new social order. The CDS assumed a uniquely broad range of state 
responsibilities, including ensuring citizen security, providing for social welfare, enabling 
political participation, and delivering public goods.107 The CDS served as a cornerstone 
of citizen security in the aftermath of the revolution. Local committees not only serve as 
conduits of reporting criminal behavior, but they also serve as crime prevention units 
active, as José Miguel Cruz observes, “in the development of local safety strategies.”108 
The chief of the PNC in 2014, Aminta Granera, attributed Nicaraguan internal security 
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successes to a combination of measures that are “preventivo, comunitario y proactivo,” or 
preventative, community-based, and proactive.109 
Also key to the high functional capacity of Nicaragua’s security sector has been 
the legacy its professional and well-trained police force, which is one of the oldest 
continuous civilian police forces in the region.110 After the 1979 revolution, the 
Sandinistas invited the Panamanian National Guard in to train its newly created PNC.111 
Several hundred Nicaraguan police officers also attended police academies in Panama 
during the years after the revolution.112 The Army intelligence report details how the 
Nicaraguans soon created a sophisticated police academy that “includes an 8-month 
course emphasizing physical fitness, criminology, sociology, law, and political 
indoctrination” with “advanced training” for “specialized administrative positions such as 
prosecutors or police chiefs.”113  
In summary, the removal of Somoza constituted an earlier break with reactionary 
despotism, and the new Nicaraguan government seized the opportunity to create effective 
internal security institutions. Though initially designed to solidify FSLN control, the 
security institutions were capable of adapting and transitioning to democracy without 
requiring the kinds of fundamental reforms seen in El Salvador. The Nicaraguan regime 
had established a monopoly of the legitimate use of force over territory more capably 
than did El Salvador during its civil war.  
B. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SECURITY STRATEGIES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
According to the rational choice criminology hypothesis, effective security 
strategies correlate with reduced violence rates by making violent crime a less appealing 
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a choice for the individual. Three elements emerge in security and policing literature as 
essential to sound internal security and criminological approaches: community 
involvement, intelligence gathering capabilities, and recidivism reduction programs. Each 
is elaborated below. 
Community involvement refers to the concept of police legitimacy as aptly 
described by Sargeant et al. According to the authors, the first characteristic of police 
legitimacy is a perception that causes “people [to] feel that they ought to defer to their 
decisions and rules, cooperate with them and follow them voluntarily.”114 A metric to 
measure legitimacy consists of “public ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’ in police,” namely that 
“the police perform their job well, that they are honest and they can secure public 
confidence in their ability to perform.”115 As Sargeant et al. contend, an effective internal 
security strategy “requires the ongoing support and voluntary cooperation of the 
public.”116 
Intelligence gathering capabilities consists of security forces’ ability to use 
intelligence and good information collecting practices to collect information on and 
effectively track criminal threats. A high rating would be given to a security force defined 
by what Janet Evans and Mark Kebbell call “being an intelligence-led organization,” 
which consists of “having an organization for which intelligence is part of the way they 
think, is inherent in their values and is a way of doing business.”117 Metrics for 
information-gathering capabilities include crime clearance rates but analysis also relies 
on inference based on security structure. 
The last indicator, recidivism reduction programs, measures the degree to which 
internal security strategies recognize the centrality of treatment and reintegration of 
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delinquents—a security posture especially important for complex social phenomena like 
gangs, as Luis Preciado argues.118 In societies where gangs and organized crime pose a 
threat, security forces, as Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering contend, must “‘address 
the broader context in which people commit crimes through a range of social and 
environmental strategies.’”119 The key metric to measure rehabilitative orientation is the 
existence of laws, security practices, and state agencies dedicated to pursuing 
rehabilitation strategies. 
1. Nicaragua 
The first case study centers on Nicaragua. Rankings in each category consist of a 
qualitative judgment based on the criteria outlined above and fall into one of three 
categories: High, medium, or low, with high representing the best rating, and low the 
poorest.   
a. Community Involvement: HIGH 
The first metric in my analysis involves the level of community buy-in to the state 
security apparatus. Community buy-in is crucial in states that have authoritarian pasts, 
since individuals freed from authoritarian regimes have long memories and can be slow 
to trust even reformed security forces. In Nicaragua, the overthrow of Somoza marked a 
conscious point of departure from security tactics using repression and torture. As the 
current head of the PNC, Aminta Granera, a former nun and FSLN revolutionary, stated 
regarding the establishment of the national police in 1979, “We didn’t know how to be 
police. We only knew we didn’t want to be like the Somozan Guard.”120  
A key metric of community buy-in is the citizen approval rating evident in the 
opinion surveys conducted by LAPOP. On a scale of 1.0 to 7.0, with 7.0 being the 
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highest rating, Nicaraguans ranked the police at a consistently above-average level—
between 4.0 and 4.5—during each of the years between 2004 and 2010.121 
Latinobarómetro reports that 37.5% of citizens have a “lot” or “some” trust in the police, 
contrasted with only 27.4% of El Salvadorans asked the same question.122 
Community buy-in to Nicaragua’s security force commences with recruitment. 
According to the Economist, local communities must explicitly approve each new recruit 
to the Nicaraguan PNC.123 As the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) notes, 
the approval process consists of the selection office meeting “with students’ families and 
community members every six months, in addition to the exams and initial investigation 
carried out in the candidate’s community.”124 The PNC also coordinates actions with a 
cadre of 100,000 volunteers that include students of law and psychology, thousands of 
ex-gang members who volunteer to mentor youth at sports tournaments, and thousands of 
victims of domestic violence who share their experiences to deter and educate the 
population.125 Nicaragua’s CDCs have been transformed, as Orlando Pérez notes, into 
“neighborhood watch organizations and then were linked to the National Police after the 
approval of the 1996 organic law.”126 Thus, the community not only supports the police 
and views them as legitimate, but it also has a high level of community involvement in 
anti-crime activity. 
b. Intelligence Gathering Capabilities: MEDIUM 
 The ability of security forces to gather information pertains both to prospective 
criminals and those who have already committed crimes. Nicaraguan police have one of 
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the highest crime-clearance rates in Central America at 81%, just slightly below the 
regional high of Costa Rica at 82%.127 Internal security forces in Nicaragua also have a 
robust information-gathering network based on constructive relationships with citizens. 
The police have worked to identify potential delinquents and collect intelligence with this 
citizen cooperation. As Cruz points out, the state excels at “involving citizens in crime 
prevention committees—not in mere neighborhood watch groups—in the development of 
local safety strategies.”128  
There is a dark side to Nicaragua’s effective information gathering capabilities 
under President Daniel Ortega that prevents the state from achieving a “high” rating in 
this category. President Ortega in 2007 established Citizen Power Councils (CPC) to 
replace the CDCs as the means of FSLN consolidation of power. Months after Ortega 
established the CPCs in December 2007, the New York Times reported that political 
opponents in Nicaragua feared that the CPCs would ensure the “Ortega’s administration’s 
drift toward an authoritarian and secretive government that does not have to answer to the 
legislature.”129 Many fear that the CPCs will engage in authoritarian measures to silence 
dissent and ensure pro-FLSN candidates retain power on local and regional levels.130  
c. Recidivism Reduction Programs: HIGH 
Nicaragua’s national police force has avoided the zero-tolerance mano dura 
policies of the Northern Triangle states. José Luis Rocha accurately characterizes 
Nicaragua’s approach as “neither the strong arm nor the benevolent hand.” Rocha 
discovered through his research and contacts within the National Police the existence of 
two distinct networks of police officers.131 The first network draws from the traditional 
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Nicaraguan elite and focuses more on the maintenance of public order through firm law-
and-order policies, like distributing to the media intimidating videos of officers forcefully 
arresting juvenile gang members.132 The second network draws from the FSLN elite and 
maintains informal contacts with gangs.133 According to Rocha, the Sandinista network 
within the police is responsible for approaching the issue of gang violence from a 
sociological and rehabilitative perspective.134 Rocha contends that the National Police 
approached the issue of gang violence in a distinctively sophisticated and rehabilitative 
manner: 
The Sandinista elite’s ability to use sociological terms and concepts and 
their notoriously superior discursive capacity in relation to their Central 
American colleagues enabled the appearance of innovative proposals and 
an assessment of citizen security that deepened the analysis of youth gangs 
without criminalising their members.135  
One example of this involved Managua’s Police District II that created a 
“desalzamiento” propaganda campaign to encourage delinquent youth to “‘end your 
rebellion.’”136 The strategy involved three phases, including “truce, armistice, and 
reintegration into the work force.” Ungar and Arias point to another example of 
Nicaragua’s rehabilitative approach: “Nicaragua’s Plan de Acción y Exposición ‘Policia-
Comunidad,’” (Community-police action plan and exhibition), “for example, focuses on 
juvenile delinquency, education and reintegration into society by gang members and 
other young offenders.”137  
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2. El Salvador 
Having evaluated Nicaragua, I now use the same criteria to assess El Salvador. As 
before, rankings in each category consist of a qualitative judgment based on the criteria 
outlined above. The three categories remain—from best to worst qualitatively—high, 
medium, and low. 
a. Community Involvement: LOW  
The Chapultepec Peace Accords laid the groundwork for improving and 
professionalizing the police force in El Salvador, but the police as an institution suffer 
from corruption, incompetence, and trust deficits. According to LAPOP’s surveys 
between 2004 and 2010, citizens’ trust in the police declined from a high of 4.6 out of 7.0 
in 2004 to 3.9 as of 2010.138 In 2015, Latinobarómetro reported that only 27.4% of El 
Salvadorans had a “lot” or “some” trust in the police, contrasted with 37.5% for 
Nicaraguans asked the same question.139 In 2013, Amnesty International issued a 
statement condemning El Salvador’s ongoing record of impunity for human rights 
violators from the civil war period.140 El Salvador has yet to overcome the legacy of 
impunity embodied by the amnesty law following the UN Truth Commission’s report in 
1993 that granted immunity to regime actors found to have committed crimes during the 
civil war period.141 Low citizen confidence in the efficacy of the police is evident in the 
common practice of hiring of private security guards, which outnumber national police at 
28,600 to 22,000 police.142  
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b. Intelligence Gathering Capabilities: LOW 
El Salvador’s police force suffers from endemic resource shortfalls, with most of 
the money used for salaries and benefits of the officers.143 Resource constraints, 
corruption, and poor police training lead to crime clearance rates as low as 5%.144 Such 
low crime clearance rates suggest, at least in part, a police force that lacks a methodology 
of sound information-gathering procedures. A 2009 Strategic Plan for the police in El 
Salvador written by the PNC itself identifies the low “development of police 
investigation and intelligence” as a key problem.145 Low rates of crime clearance also 
point to the poor working relationship between the judiciary and the police, as Seelke 
notes.146 Due to police ineptitude, the government has repeatedly resorted to the military 
to police the streets and counter gangs and organized crime. Using the military constitutes 
an imperfect fix that brings about concerns of its own, especially given El Salvador’s 
problematic history with human rights abuses.147 One sign of hope emerged with the 
passing of a new law that raises taxes to pay for “police, investigators and other security 
institutions” by raising taxes on wealthy individuals and large companies.148 
c. Recidivism Reduction Programs: LOW 
As Cruz points out, El Salvador “brags about developing programs through which 
thousands of gang members have been captured, while their prevention and rehabilitation 
programs have been relegated to a secondary level.”149 The rehabilitation programs have 
“neither the resources nor results to show for;” in 2005, for instance, the government 
recorded having arrested 14,000 gang members and treated just 45 in the school-farm 
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rehabilitative program.150 Some signs of hope are visible, however, leading to El Salvador 
avoiding a pure “low” rating in this category. On October 26, 2015, El Salvador’s Security 
and Justice Minister formally presented Congress with a proposed law that would allow gang 
members to avoid terrorism charges that carry long minimum prison sentences, as long as 
they have not committed serious offenses like homicides.151 The proposed law, formally 
called the “Gang Reinsertion Law,” faces considerable obstacles in the form of funding, the 
lack of which Michael Lohmuller argues caused the gang truce to fizzle in 2012.152 
Nevertheless, initiatives like this at least suggest security officials are beginning to recognize 
the importance of rehabilitative policies toward gangs. 
3. Summary of Findings: Internal Security Approaches 
The multidimensional variable of internal security approaches was ascertained by 
looking at community involvement, intelligence capacity and recidivism programs in 
each country. As Table 4 indicates, Nicaragua attained a HIGH overall rating, while El 
Salvador earned a LOW rating. Thus, if the rational choice criminology hypothesis is 
correct, Nicaragua should have lower violence rates than in El Salvador. As indicated by 
the homicide rates in Table 5, the findings correlate with the outcome predicted by the 
rational choice criminology hypothesis. Nicaragua’s criminological approaches correlate 
with a homicide rate of 8 per 100,000, while El Salvador’s correlate with a homicide rate 
of 103 per 100,000. 















Nicaragua MEDIUM HIGH HIGH HIGH 
El Salvador LOW LOW LOW LOW 
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C. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE RATIONAL CHOICE 
CRIMINOLOGY HYPOTHESIS  
This chapter tested the rational choice criminology hypothesis in the cases of 
Nicaragua and El Salvador by conducting, first, a historical inquiry and, second, an 
evaluation of criminological approaches. The first part of the chapter examined how 
Nicaragua’s community-based, intelligence-centric security approach originated in the 
period following the 1979 revolution against Somoza and the FSLN consolidation of 
political control. Central to Nicaragua’s model was the creation of the CDS that 
constituted far-reaching, community-based security structures tied to public assistance 
programs. Additionally, the newly created PNC emphasized education and sound 
policing strategies. After the democratic transition these community-based organizations 
were effectively modified to deal with emerging threats. CDSs were transformed into 
neighborhood watch organizations and subsumed under the capable PNC. On the 
contrary, El Salvador’s security forces developed an adversarial, counterinsurgent-
dominated approach during the 1980s civil war period. This history would undermine the 
security sector’s attempt to form sound criminological approaches after the Chapultepec 
Peace Accords of 1992, which reorganized, restructured, and redefined El Salvador’s 
security forces. The second part of the chapter confirmed, through an evaluation of 
indicators of sound criminological approaches, a positive correlation between the quality 
of internal security approaches and lower incidences of violent crime. Highly violent El 
Salvador scored worse in each indicator than did Nicaragua, the country with the region’s 
lowest homicide rate. 
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IV. EVALUATING THE INSTITUTIONALIST HYPOTHESIS 
The previous chapter tested the rational choice criminology hypothesis and 
affirmed its validity vis-à-vis Nicaragua and El Salvador: sound criminological 
approaches correlated with violent crime outcomes as expected. Using the same case 
studies, this chapter assesses the validity of the institutionalist hypothesis, which posits 
that states with superior security institutions should have lower violence rates, while 
states with inferior security institutions should have higher violence rates. In the chapter’s 
first part, I use Bruneau and Matei’s indicator of effectiveness to evaluate the quality of 
each country’s security institutions. The findings corroborate the hypothesis’s predicted 
outcome: in the aggregate, less violent Nicaragua scores higher in institutional 
effectiveness than more violent El Salvador. The chapter’s second part seeks to account 
for the present institutional outcomes using a historical path-dependency analysis. The 
findings indicate that the method of institutional reform during each country’s democratic 
transition emerges as the key independent variable. Specifically, following El Salvador’s 
systematic use of terror during the civil war of the 1980s, negotiators prioritized the 
purification of state security institutions at the expense of effectiveness. To the contrary, 
Nicaraguan security institutions benefited from continuity and stability during the 
democratic transition. 
A. ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: PLANS, 
STRUCTURES, AND RESOURCES 
This section assesses the quality of security institutions in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador using the criterion of effectiveness established by Bruneau and Matei.154 
Elaborating on the criterion of institutional effectiveness, Matei has proposed three 
indicators: plans, structures, and resources.155 Each of the three indicators is 
characterized by specific benchmarks. 
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The first indicator, plans, refers to the quality of a state’s policies and strategies in 
relation to law enforcement and crime prevention.156 Internal security plans should 
reflect cogent strategies, doctrine, tactics, and programs that not only include sound 
policing strategies but also security approaches shared across government agencies. 
Second, structures include the processes “to both formulate the plans and implement 
them,” usually in the form of effective state agencies that develop and coordinate security 
policies throughout the government.157 Structures also pertain to the efficacy of training, 
institutional knowledge, technical capabilities, criminal justice coordination, and the 
other indicators of institutional proficiencies. Third, Matei defines resources as “political 
capital, money, and personnel” that allow forces to “implement the assigned roles and 
missions.”158 The resources indicator not only refers to whether institutions are backed 
by adequate resources, but also whether those resources are allocated in an appropriate 
and efficient manner 
1. El Salvador 
This section commences with an evaluation of El Salvador based on the criteria 
outlined above. I use Matei’s ranking terminology of Low, Medium, and High, with low 
as worst and high as best qualitatively. Each ranking is determined through a qualitative 
assessment. 
a. Plans: Low 
Since the Chapultepec Peace Accords of 1992, El Salvador’s policy development 
agencies have been weak and ineffective. The National Public Security Council (CNSP) 
of 1996 was designed, largely due to international pressure as WOLA reports, to “analyze 
the public security situation and develop policies and strategies for the medium to long 
term,” yet the government minister in charge neutralized and obstructed the CNSP.159 
Similarly, in 1999, the government charged the CNSP with developing preventative 
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strategies, but WOLA points out that the CNSP was “excluded from major decision 
making to such an extent that it has had serious disagreements with governmental 
actions,” including the government’s primary anti-gang Mano Dura initiative.160 As 
Edgardo Alberto Amaya points out, opportunists capitalized on public fear during the 
aftermath of the peace accords to militarize internal security: “The alarm over insecurity 
was one of the arguments conservatives used to sabotage and distort the new security 
model.”161 As a result, El Salvador lacks proactive and preventative anti-gang policies, 
including preventative and rehabilitative strategies, and fails to coordinate effective 
interagency plans.162  
Lacking proactive internal security plans, El Salvador has relied on reactive Mano 
Dura strategies that incriminate and incarcerate gang members. International initiatives, 
like the Inter-American Development Bank’s $45 million (IDB) Violence Prevention 
Strategy Comprehensive Support Program of 2014, are trying to instill internal security 
plans that include preventative and rehabilitative measures.163 The government also 
announced in 2014 a community policing initiative for San Salvador involving thousands 
of retrained officers; however, the precise structure of community coordination, as well 
as the program’s results, remain unclear.164 Nevertheless, as a recent illustration of the 
continued influence of Mano Dura strategies, in May 2016, El Salvadoran Vice President 
Ortiz publicly asserted gangs would be defeated within a year by stricter penalties and 
more restrictive incarceration policies.165  
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$120  63.6% 11,732 1.9 30% 
 
El Salvador 
$424 64.7% 22,055 3.5 10.5% 
 
b. Structures: Low 
As Amaya observes, “the PNC’s centralized organization and its internal politics 
have been barriers to creating a coordination mechanism linking local governments, the 
police, and other centralized institutions to orchestrate efforts to prevent and treat local 
problems.”167 The lack of structural coordination has undermined the criminal justice 
system such that, as a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report from 
2007 detailed, “‘In most of the cases analyzed, there is no sign that the prosecutor 
systematically directed the investigation, nor that the police obeyed the prosecution’s 
instructions.’”168 Moreover, the attorney general and the national police have a poor 
working relationship, as WOLA notes, such that there is no “established, permanent, and 
systematic mechanism for communicating and defining common objectives, priorities, 
and mutual support at all levels.”169 Structural problems undermine the rule of law in El 
Salvador, with only 37 percent of victims bothering to report crimes, of which 60 percent 
never make it into the judicial system.170 
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On a structural level vis-à-vis the national police, El Salvador’s Strategic 
Institutional Plan 2009–2014 indicates several deficiencies in the police force including 
“lack of incentives,” “little development of police investigation and intelligence,” “lack 
of standardization in the databases,” “fragmented organization,” and “lack of training.”171 
Poor administration and lack of uniformity in the collection of evidence also hinder the 
police.172 As previously discussed, policy development organizations like the CNSP have 
been structurally obstructed from coordinating a preventative security strategy with the 
competent security institutions. El Salvador’s Mano Dura strategy has tried to make up 
for structural inadequacies, pushing constitutional limitations on the military’s role in 
internal policing. In 2015, the president ordered up to 7,000 of the military’s total force of 
25,000 to patrol the streets.173 
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c. Resources: Low 
Another challenge has been a deficit of political capital, personnel, and money—
the three resource criteria outlined by Matei—that afflict security institutions in El 
Salvador.175 Politically, Mano Dura remains popular, and politicians lack the will and 
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incentive to invest in long-term preventative security strategies. The result is a status quo 
that favors heavy-handed, reactive solutions. A newspaper correspondent in San Salvador 
illustrates the chaotic security situation that has become accepted as the norm: 
Schools are protected by barbed wire and often patrolled by soldiers; 
private security guards carrying shotguns man the entrance to major 
businesses and police, armed with rifles, conduct random checks on the 
highways….it is not uncommon to see soldiers in balaclavas riding on the 
back of flat-bed trucks mounted with heavy machine guns. Few people 
pay them a second glance.176  
Reflective of the government’s infatuation with ongoing Mano Dura strategies, 
resource allocation flows to elite militarized units, as WOLA observes, “due to the 
political backing they enjoy.”177 Moreover, U.S. assistance has most often focused on the 
training and equipping of such specialized units, including anti-gang workshops 
sponsored by the U.S. State Department and the U.S.-funded International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Santa Tecla, as well as the FBI’s direct involvement in 
combined units like the Transnational Anti-Gang unit (TAG).178 
Pertaining to personnel, crucial investigative training in the civilian police force is 
poorly funded, leaving officers ill equipped to handle the most fundamental aspects of 
police work. Pre-commissioning education consists of nine months of instruction 
followed by three months of on-the-job training, while continuing education is optional 
and of poor quality.179According to a study by the El Salvadoran Fundación de Estudios 
para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD) (Foundation for the study and application of 
law) the PNC is “better trained for carrying out detentions, interventions, and patrol 
operations” than “interaction with the community through community policing.”180 
Moreover, a 2007 study by UNDP consultants revealed “major deficiencies in basic 
investigative techniques,” including “crime scene preservation and fingerprinting, 
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evidence gathering, alteration of crime scenes, and weaknesses in the identification of, 
search for, and interviewing of witnesses.”181 Basic training for investigators lasts only 
three weeks, although some specialized courses are available at the International Law 
Enforcement Academy in Santa Tecla, as well as via various international programs.182 
Still, investigative agencies do not have sufficient manpower to meet requirements. The 
deputy director of investigations, according to WOLA, “acknowledged that ‘in general, 
there are deficits at every level….There is a substantial deficiency with respect to the 
number of staff assigned to cases.’”183  
Table 8.   National Police Promotion Process184 
Nicaragua El Salvador 
 Promotion process mostly 
transparent and accords with 
codified law 
 Largely merit-based 
 Increased political meddling in 
process since FSLN’s Ortega 
returned to presidency 
 Promotion process frequently 
arbitrary, through legislative 
decrees 
 Accusations of favoritism for pre-
Chapultepec officers 
 Reprisals and intimidation common 
 
Financially, as the Latin American Security and Defense Network (RESDAL) has 
reported, the PNC asserts that its “limited operational budget” cripples its ability to carry 
out missions effectively.185 The chronic lack of resources allocated to the internal 
security is apparent by the fact that private security guards outnumber police 28,600 to 
22,000.186 The government has traditionally been reluctant to raise taxes to finance 
deficiencies and instead prefers to borrow from the U.S. government, the World Bank, 
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and other international donors, which have often fallen short of commitments.187 A 
reversal of this tendency occurred in October 2015, when El Salvador’s Congress passed 
a major tax on corporations and communications services to be used, as Reuters reported, 
“to fund police, investigators and other security institutions.”188 Although potentially a 
positive development, the law’s effect remains to be seen, and few details are available 
about the extent of revenues that will be generated.189 Some other areas of improvement 
include improvements in technical systems that support investigative work and database 
maintenance.190  
Table 9.   Key Internal Security Structure Considerations191 
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2. Nicaragua 
The chapter continues with an evaluation of Nicaragua based on the criteria 
outlined above. Again I use Matei’s ranking terminology of Low, Medium, and High, 
with low as worst and high as best based on a qualitative assessment. 
a. Plans: High 
Rocha commends the “exceptional character of the Nicaraguan police,” especially 
their “conciliatory discourse and propaganda” and their attempt to “overcome repressive 
penal models,” instead treating gang members as objects of social rehabilitation.192 
Rocha contends that the National Police approached the issue of gang violence in a 
distinctively sophisticated manner: 
The Sandinista elite’s ability to use sociological terms and concepts and 
their notoriously superior discursive capacity in relation to their Central 
American colleagues enabled the appearance of innovative proposals and 
an assessment of citizen security that deepened the analysis of youth gangs 
without criminalising their members.193  
Observing that “effective policy hinges on leadership,” a Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) report notes that Chief of Police Granera has had more than 
30 years of experience in law enforcement—a fact that highlights the continuity of policy 
and strategies from the Sandinista period through the democratic transition and to the 
present.194 In 2014, Granera described the consistent security strategy that she asserts has 
contributed to Nicaragua’s relatively low violent crime rates as “preventivo, comunitario 
y proactivo” (preventative, community-based, and proactive).195 The community-based 
model of policing represents an adaptation of the Sandinista form of political control. As 
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outlined in the previous chapter, the Chamorro administration depoliticized the police and 
transformed the FSLN’s community-based CDS organizations into apolitical 
neighborhood watch groups that liaised with the police.  
Nicaragua has been far more proactive in developing internal security plan than El 
Salvador. In light of the growing menace posed by gang violence, the government 
completed a diagnostic evaluation of its internal security plans in 1999 and found the 
need to formulate a comprehensive citizen security plan, which resulted a five-year, 
$49.3 million USD plan known as the National Police’s Modernization and Development 
Plan for the Strengthening of Citizen Security.196 The plan encompassed an array of 
preventative approaches designed not only prosecute but also deter the proliferation of 
gangs and related violence. Evincing its comprehensive approach, in 2004 the president 
ordered the creation of the Division for Coexistence and Citizen Security (DCSC), which 
identified seven strategic focal points for internal security: drugs, youth violence, 
domestic violence, robberies, transit security, local community prevention, and social 
communication.197 Moreover, the government created the Office of Juvenile Issues as the 
central node for the development for its preventative model of gang violence 
prevention.198 Finally, the Nicaraguan police have, uniquely for Central America, 
prioritized the role of women; in 1996, the Gender Consultative Council spurred reforms 
in recruitment and retention of female officers, such that Nicaragua has emerged as the 
regional leader with females comprising more than 32% of the force and a stated goal of 
50%.199  
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Figure 11.  Homicide Clearance Rates (2007)200 
b. Structures:  Medium 
Nicaragua’s police operate independently from the military, which conduct 
limited internal security missions. Instead, the military’s role in internal security is 
limited to about 2,000 troops who provide security for Nicaragua’s coffee production.201 
In contrast to El Salvador, Nicaragua has not used the military for anti-gang and anti-drug 
policy responses. Instead, the preventative and community-based model of policing have 
fostered effective civilian-led structures that coordinate internal security policies. As 
Cruz points out, the state excels at “involving citizens in crime prevention committees—
not in mere neighborhood watch groups—in the development of local safety 
strategies.”202 At the lowest level, Nicaragua has created 2,064 Comités de Prevención 
Social del Delito (Committees on social crime prevention), comprised of 20,000 
volunteers that liaise with the police.203 Moreover, unlike El Salvador, Nicaragua has 
also invested resources in programs to prevent of gang violence that support its 
community-oriented approach, including sports tournaments, cooperation with social 
services volunteers, and scholarships for youth.204  
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Finally, the police, as Rocha argues, the police have achieved a structural 
equilibrium between two complementary ideological factions: the traditional elite and the 
FSLN.205 The FSLN faction has encouraged the rehabilitative policies toward gangs and 
resisted pressure from traditional elites who sought to implement policies similar to Mano 
Dura, while the traditional elites have encouraged the development of efficient policing 
and judicial processes.206 The FSLN faction continues to advocate for what Mark Ungar 
describes as the “many strong social programs” from the 1980s that “continue to provide 
generous support for youth.”207 The traditional elites meanwhile have pushed for laws 
like the Integrated Development Plan for the Prevention of Juvenile Violence passed in 
1999, which allowed the police to incarcerate suspected gang members without first 
obtaining warrants, in an effort to “‘clamp down on visible youth crime and thereby 
restore a sense of security among the urban populace.’”208 
 
Figure 12.  Number of Military Personnel Assigned to Internal Security Missions 
(2015)209 
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c. Resources: Medium 
Whereas political will in El Salvador favors investing in security forces that 
enforce Mano Dura policies, Nicaraguan security institutions are backed by a political 
will that favors a distribution of resources to support its preventative and community-
based approaches. As Cruz points out, while states of the Northern Triangle, like El 
Salvador, reacted to increased gang activity with Mano Dura policies, the approach failed 
to take root because “the police—which promoted a softer approach—had a significant 
amount of political power in within the Nicaraguan administration.”210 
Pertaining to personnel, Nicaragua created a more rigorous education and training 
its police force than El Salvador, as summarized in Table 6 above. In contrast to El 
Salvador, the Nicaraguan PNC has a rigorous education program for both accession and 
ongoing career development. Initial training consists of four-year degrees at the National 
Police Academy leading to commissioning.211 Additionally, unlike El Salvador, the 
government funds high-quality continuing education courses mandatory for career 
progression. Continuing education opportunities include specialized skill courses; 
refresher training; and formal five-month, three-year, and five-year curricula.212 The 
Nicaraguan academy also offers courses dedicated to the science of community policing, 
another feature that differentiates police education from El Salvador.213 Moreover, 
Nicaragua has dedicated police units that focus on violence prevention in relation to 
women and children.214  
Financially, on the surface Nicaragua’s low ratio of police officers to population 
suggests a paucity of resource allocation to internal security. As a 2012 CSIS report 
indicates, Nicaragua’s ratio of police officers to population, at 180 per 100,000 people, is 
less than half of the Latin American regional median of 284 per 100,000, which is close 
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to El Salvador’s level.215 Nevertheless, even though Nicaragua’s security budget has 
remained steady at an average of 1.2% of GDP between the years 2005 and 2013, the 
share of the budget allotted to the PNC has risen by 64% over the same eight years, a 
larger increase than any other Nicaraguan security organization.216 Moreover, as Bruneau 
notes, Nicaragua’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP suggests that the state has greater 
extractive capacity and thus comparatively more resources to allocate than does El 
Salvador.217 Nicaragua collects 26% of its GDP in taxes annually, compared with just 
19.4% in El Salvador.218 Moreover, focusing strictly on the level of police funding 
cannot account for the structural composition of internal security that CSIS labels a 
“preventative and communitarian approach to law enforcement.”219 
3. Summary of Findings: Institutional Effectiveness 
As Table 10 demonstrates, Nicaraguan internal security institutions are more 
effective than those of El Salvador in that superior plans, structures, and resources 
characterize the former.  
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This section evaluated the variable of internal security institution using the Bruneau-
Matei model that focuses on the indicators of plans, structures, and resources. The 
findings corroborate the institutionalist hypothesis that would expect less violent 
Nicaragua to have more effective security institutions than more violent El Salvador. 
Having established where each state ranks on an institutional basis, the next section seeks 
to account for the historical factors that have influenced the observed divergent levels of 
institutional effectiveness. 
B. COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
AND EFFECTIVENESS 
This section focuses on the institutional transition to democracy in the beginning 
of the 1990s, a critical period that shaped the configuration of plans, structures, and 
resources of security institutions in the present era. The method of security sector 
transition into the democratic era emerges as a significant independent variable that best 
accounts for institutional evolution to the current state of effectiveness. El Salvador’s 
democratic transition emerged from a negotiated settlement at the Chapultepec Peace 
Accords that prioritized purification over effectiveness. The reform process consisted of 
formal peace negotiations involving two sides of a protracted civil war—the FMLN and 
the government. On the contrary, Nicaragua’s democratic transition involved the peaceful 
relinquishing of FSLN power following President Chamorro’s election in 1990. 
Chamorro’s administration did not see security institutions as requiring massive reform 
and purification, which instead underwent informally negotiated transitions in many key 
areas, including the police, civil defense committees, and criminology approaches. 
Throughout the transition, institutional effectiveness was prioritized. This section begins 
with El Salvador and then moves to analyze Nicaragua. 
1. Prioritizing Purification: Reforming El Salvador’s Security 
Institutions  
The genesis of El Salvador’s security institution reforms—the Chapultepec Peace 
Accords—cannot be understood without the context of the civil war that immediately 
preceded it and, particularly, the regime’s use of state terrorism. Michael Tigar defines 
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state terrorism as systematic and deliberate “state-sponsored violence, conducted against 
political enemies, and in disregard of historically determined fair substantive procedural 
standards.”220 Christian Davenport finds that El Salvador’s security institutions 
unquestionably employed state terror against the FLMN during the civil war. One aspect 
of Davenport’s analysis of state repression uses the scale popularized by Poe and Tate to 
measure “‘personal integrity violation’” also known as the “Political Terror Scale 
(PTS).”221 Davenport classified El Salvador’s regime during the period from 1978–1992 
as a level four out of five, with five constituting the most extreme form of personal 
integrity violations.222 For a state in this category, according to Davenport, 
imprisonment, murders, and disappearances “are a common part of life” for those “who 
interest themselves in politics or ideas” opposed to the regime.223  
In its determination to defeat the FMLN, a powerful military-dominated regime 
often undertook actions classified as state terrorism. David Pion-Berlin argues that 
regimes engage in a two-step process to decide whether to use terror as a form of political 
control: first, they evaluate the nature of the threat, and then they conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of using terror.224 In essence, Pion-Berlin contends that regimes that “practice 
state terror do so because they feel threatened,” and they judge the benefits to outweigh 
the risks.225 To evaluate the threat, regimes conduct a “series of cautious estimates,” to 
include assessing the threat of the opponent, judging the opponent’s motives and 
intentions, weighing the nature of opposition actions, determining the timing of the 
threat, and lastly examining whether the threat is directed at the government.226 If the 
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regime deems the threat sufficiently grave, the governing elites then “weigh the benefits 
and risks associated with terror before choosing a course of action.”227  
Pion-Berlin’s paradigm frames the context in which El Salvador’s regime during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s formulated its policy of state terrorism. The military 
authoritarian state faced an imminent threat from a well-financed, well-armed, and vast 
FMLN army. As outlined in a previous chapter, the threat met Pion-Berlin’s criteria: the 
FMLN constituted a well-organized, intentional, imminent, grave, and direct menace.  
Indeed, El Salvador’s regime and its agents actively employed several terror 
tactics, including disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killing. As Americas Watch 
relates, the military regime and its death squads not only murdered political opponents 
but also “adopted such theatrics as publishing lists of future victims, sending their targets 
invitations to their own funerals, and delivering coffins to their doorsteps,” as well as 
mutilating victims’ bodies and phoning death threats to “subversives.”228 The state was 
actively involved in the use of terror, notwithstanding attempts to obfuscate ties to state 
actors. For instance, the use of “death squads,” as Americas Watch argues, consisted of 
“plainclothes units of the armed forces that avoid accountability by such means as using 
vehicles with smoked-glass windows and without numbered license plates.”229 Meeting 
Tigar’s criterion that terror should not simply constitute a divergence from the accepted 
norms by a minority of bad actors, the military regime never prosecuted any death squad 
members or others involved in the employment of terror tactics. On the contrary, death 
squads and their ilk operated “day and night without interference from the security forces, 
a fact showing, at a minimum, the complicity of those forces.”230 Moreover, the U.S. 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight released a fact sheet in 
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1992 admitting that U.S. training manuals for El Salvador’s security forces contained 
language inconsistent with U.S. policies against torture.231  
Against the backdrop of state repression and terrorism, the Chapultepec Peace 
Accords faced a decision common to countries transitioning from similar regimes to a 
democratic form of governance. As argued in Neil Kritz’s Transitional Justice, states 
transitioning from repressive pasts face a decision about how best to deal with crimes 
while also forging institutions that have the trust of citizens—a critical decision that 
shapes the contours of the subsequent regime’s institutions.232 As Kritz argues, the 
method of achieving transitional justice can vary on a spectrum of options, from 
vigorously prosecuting offenders and meticulously purifying security institutions, on one 
end, to offering amnesty for human rights abusers and leaving security structures largely 
in unchanged, as the other extreme.233 For El Salvador, negotiators settled on the more 
extreme form of purification of security institutions, while also offering amnesty to many 
offenders. This rigid institutional purification, and the particular method of 
implementation of reforms, contributed to ineffectiveness of security institutions reflected 
in the previous section.  
El Salvador’s transition process centered on the UN-sponsored Chapultepec Peace 
Accords of 1992. The finalized accords emerged from two years of negotiations between 
the government and the FMLN insurgents.234 Reforms were ambitious in scope with a 
number of specific goals pertaining to the purification of security institutions, including 
reforming military doctrine, altering military education, purifying security forces of 
human rights abusers, reducing prerogatives, eliminating paramilitary actors (like the 
infamous death squads), and creating a civilian-led, professionalized national police.235 
Like many states attempting to implement transitional justice, El Salvador’s military 
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reorganized after the peace accords to include equal representation of former guerilla 
insurgents. The accords called for the establishment of the PNC with a central focus on 
protecting human rights—an effort to prevent the recurrence of the widespread torture 
and killings of state security forces and death squads during the civil war.236  
Notwithstanding the honorable intentions of the reforms, some key conditions 
prioritized purification at the expense of effective plans, structures, and resources. As 
Amaya notes, the “reform had profound significance since it was not limited merely to 
the construction of a new police force but also involved a radical break from security 
policy as practiced prior to the accords.”237 Experienced personnel and structures were 
disbanded entirely, including the Treasury Police, National Police, and the National 
Guard.238 Additionally, the reforms eliminated technical expertise embodied by the 
members of El Salvador’s Special Investigative Unit (DIU) and Executive Anti-Narcotics 
Unit (UEA).239 Another condition insisted upon by the FMLN demanded that the leader 
of El Salvador’s newly created PNC could have no ties to the previous security 
apparatus.240 As indicated previously, the first director of the PNC, a businessman, had 
no prior police experience and consequently had no experience on which to rely for the 
development of a security strategy.241 In a similar vein, the FMLN insisted that the PNC 
be comprised of mostly civilians with no prior background in policing, with the exception 
of 20 percent of the top positions allotted to both the security forces of the former regime 
and the FMLN.242 Moreover, many of the FMLN applicants lacked the necessary 
educational backgrounds, further diluting the capabilities of the new force.243 As a 
contemporary U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report indicates, reforms 
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like these left El Salvador’s new security institutions aimless: “The government had not 
yet developed plans outlining the structure, operations, or resource needs of the police 
force.”244  
The context of the immediate post-Chapultepec period also hindered the effective 
reformation of security institutions. The explosion of gang violence began while the 
consolidation of El Salvador’s new civilian police force was still underway. As a WOLA 
report observes, “the violent context favored an emphasis on a greater police presence 
and deployment across the territory, leaving aside other important aspects such as a 
rigorous selection process capable of filtering out applicants unfit for service.”245 WOLA 
also notes that the chaotic security context of the post-Chapultepec period impeded 
“police training, the development of institutional planning capacity, and the creation of a 
disciplinary system.”246 Moreover, Roberto Atha points out that police training in the 
aftermath of the peace accords suffered from considerable deficiencies in the areas of 
investigative methodology, access to basic police equipment, and adequate training 
sites.247  
Another complication emerged from the fact that reforms failed to fundamentally 
transform the incentives and practices of institutional actors, with an enduring bias 
toward favoring the military as an institution over the newly created civilian national 
police. Massive and unconditional U.S. support during the civil war, combined with 
habits of state terrorism, had left a military institution with high prerogatives and little 
accountability.248 As late as 1989 the New York Times observed that military officers and 
those associated with the armed forces benefited from “exorbitant sums bestowed upon 
them in recent years in substantial measure to line their own pockets and enhance their 
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own power.”249 The newspaper eloquently summarized how such massive U.S. 
assistance created an unaccountable military elite: 
‘One billion dollars in American military aid seems to have bought an 
army big enough to survive its own mistakes, and powerful enough to 
resist any effort to reform it—to end pervasive corruption or to weed out 
corrupt officers. Instead of fostering reform, the American money has 
been absorbed into a network of corruption and patronage that has grown 
up over a century, and has made the Salvadoran military an empire unto 
itself.’250 
In a move emblematic of the military’s prerogatives, in 1993 the government 
granted blanket impunity to former security regime actors, notwithstanding the UN-
sponsored Truth Commission’s findings that the military regime and its agents committed 
over 85 percent of the serious acts of violence.251 Furthermore, as Cruz contends, 
maneuvering by the entrenched elites caused serious setbacks in the critical years of the 
reform following the peace accords, resulting in a diminished “capacity of the police to 
build an effective and professional organization to confront the problem of organized 
crime.”252 
El Salvador’s counterproductive and militaristic policy responses—Mano Dura 
and Super Mano Dura—reflect the both the lasting military prerogatives and the inability 
of the police to formulate effective plans, implement adequate structures, and garner 
sufficient resources. The police never acquired the requisite level of institutional 
proficiency needed to confront new security challenges of gangs and organized crime. 
Consequently, despite constitutionally only being authorized for emergencies, El 
Salvador’s military has continued to act as a primary agent in the struggle against the 
gangs and organized crime.  
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2. Pragmatic Continuity: Nicaragua’s Institutional Evolution 
In contrast to El Salvador, Nicaragua did not undergo a process of purification 
and profound institutional reformation following the Contra War. Nicaragua’s security 
forces instead underwent a pragmatic restructuring that loosened FSLN control while 
largely maintaining the institutional knowledge, experience, and practices developed 
during the previous decade. Targeted purges, informal negotiations, and legislation 
constituted the means of institutional reform, in contrast to the experience of El Salvador. 
This section examines several of the significant features of Nicaragua’s institutional 
evolution and how these worked to enable the effectiveness reflected above in the 
indicators of plans, structures, and resources. 
While El Salvador’s internal security forces were engaging in state terrorism in 
the 1980s to combat the FMLN, Nicaragua’s FSLN government had created a civilian 
Sandinista Police by late 1979 consisting of 12,000 members.253 Notwithstanding the 
ongoing conflict with the Contras during the 1980s, the Sandinista police, as WOLA 
points out, “were able to accumulate an important body of technical and organizational 
experience” that enabled the institution “to construct a policing model focused on 
prevention, education, and service to the community in an effort to ensure a high level of 
efficiency despite the country’s poverty.”254 Unlike in El Salvador during the 1980s, the 
police in Nicaragua during the 1980s developed a reputation for improving respect for 
human rights over that of the notorious Somozan National Guard.255 
Contrary to El Salvador’s profound break with the security structures during its 
civil war period, the structures that had developed over the course of the 1980s in 
Nicaragua remained largely intact. The landmark 1990 presidential elections saw the 
FSLN from removed from power with the victory of President Chamorro and her 
National Opposition Union (UNO) party. In negotiations between UNO and Sandinista 
elites, the parties agreed to three important changes to the security institutions: first, de-
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politicization of the security forces; second, a reduction in the size of the army; third, the 
relinquishment of the power to appoint the Ministers of Defense and Interior.256 
Accordingly, Nicaragua passed the Police Law passed in 1992, which transformed the 
police from its role as a pro-FSLN guardian of the revolution to, as Nicaraguan 
sociologist Rocha states, “an armed entity of civic, apolitical, non-party” character.257 
Despite its de-politicization, the PNC retained its role as chief law enforcement agency 
domestically and persevered under Sandinista leadership. As Atha points out, the 
Sandinistas maintained a strong presence in many internal security institutions, such that 
“‘the structures, institutions, and constitutional order erected while the Sandinistas had 
been in power would be left in place.’”258 One noteworthy illustration of this principle 
came when Aminta Granera, a Sandinista who had risen through the PNC ranks from 
1979 to become sub-commissioner prior to 1990, was promoted to the rank of 
commissioner in the Chamorro administration.259 Her continuity of service embodied the 
fundamental institutional stability of the Nicaraguan police force.  
Nicaraguan government institutions have worked to foster consensus-seeking 
forums for policy coordination and development. The National Police instituted a Plan de 
la prevención de las pandillas (Plan for the prevention of gangs) in 1999 that is 
characterized, as Rocha argues, by “neither the strong arm nor the benevolent hand.”260 
The bifurcated nature of plan reflects the informal negotiations within the national police 
between the FSLN and traditional factions, alluded to above. Moreover, Rocha 
participated on one initiative during the administration of President Enrique Bolaños 
(2002-2007). Named the Advisory Council of the Youth Secretariat, the working group 
consisted of regular sessions “where different interest groups—the Secretariat, the 
Bolaños government, international donors, NGOs, academics, the FSLN, the PLC, the 
National Police, and the Ombudsman’s Office—attempted to influence the country’s 
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youth policy.”261 Rocha describes how the collaborative body engaged in vital 
discussions that attempted to draw a consensus from various sectors of Nicaraguan 
government and civil society pertaining to the emergent problem of gangs. This initiative 
did not represent an isolated event, but rather occurred within a context where anti-gang 
policies had been under development for years.262  
Whereas El Salvador’s security institutions have floundered following its 
democratic transition, Nicaragua’s transition created an environment where more 
effective security institutions have developed. The relinquishment of FSLN control of the 
police and interior ministry did not involve destabilizing reforms, but rather surgical 
purges of senior leadership as well as transformation of its organizational character. The 
decentralized structure of the internal security institutions endured, and leaders 
encouraged collaborative development of security plans, structures, and resources. The 
result has been a set of security institutions that are far more effective than those in El 
Salvador, as the previous section demonstrated.  
C. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONALIST HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter evaluated the institutionalist hypothesis pertaining to Nicaragua and 
El Salvador’s security institutions from both analytical and historical perspectives. Using 
the criterion of effectiveness developed by Bruneau and Matei—along with Matei’s three 
indicators of plans, structures, and resources—the comparative analysis of El Salvador 
and Nicaragua’s security institutions corroborated the institutionalist hypothesis’s 
predicted outcome, as less violent Nicaragua emerged with higher ratings in each 
indicator of effectiveness. The second part of the chapter consisted of a comparative 
historical analysis. I found that divergence in institutional effectiveness arose from the 
different development paths taken during each country’s democratic transition at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Whereas El Salvador’s security forces underwent a disruptive 
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period of purification brought about by the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords that 
militated against effectiveness, Nicaragua’s institutional continuity fostered the formation 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
What accounts for high violence rates in certain Central American republics, and 
why are some states more violent than others in the region? These questions have 
currency in the halls of the White House, Congress, and the State Department, as high 
levels of violence in Central America pose a challenge with security implications for the 
United States. Policymakers in Washington, DC are increasingly examining the root 
causes of Central American violence. Part of the reason for the uncertainty regarding 
policy responses to Central American violence has been a lack of analytical clarity on the 
underlying causes of violence, which would enable better allocation of capital for the 
most efficient return on investment. As a means of contributing to a solution, this thesis 
examined three of the most common hypotheses—the structural economic hypothesis, the 
rational choice criminology hypothesis, and the institutionalist hypothesis—with the aim 
of assessing the strength and validity of each using objective criteria to test each 
hypothesis’s correlations with violence rates.  
The findings confirmed that two of the three hypotheses had a strong correlation 
with observed violence rates: the rational choice criminology and institutionalist 
hypotheses. From a rational choice criminology perspective, Chapter III revealed strong 
correlations between sound state criminological approaches—specifically in the areas of 
intelligence gathering, community involvement, and recidivism reduction programs—and 
lower incidences of violence in the cases examined. Likewise, Chapter IV showed the 
data supported the institutionalist hypothesis. Effective security institutions—as judged 
by the Bruneau-Matei criteria of plans, structures, and resources—correlated with lower 
violence outcomes. On the contrary, as Chapter II indicated, structural economic 
problems of poverty and inequality only weakly correlated with violence outcomes due to 
the significant divergences from the predicted outcome in the cases of Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. Notwithstanding some general regional correlations, better economic 
conditions failed to correlate as strongly as the other variables did with violence rates.  
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This chapter first assesses current U.S. policy toward Central America in light of 
the findings and policy implications. It concludes by outlining several policy implications 
that emerge from the thesis’s findings.  
A. EVALUATION OF CURRENT U.S. CENTRAL AMERICA POLICY 
The Merida Initiative, which became the Central American Regional Security 
Initiative (CARSI) in 2010, has involved the allocation of approximately $1.2 billion to 
Central American republics since program inception with the aim of stabilizing the 
internal security environments of Central American republics.263 A CARSI fact sheet 
lists five main program objectives: 
1. CREATE safe streets for the citizens of the region 
2. DISRUPT the movement of criminals and contraband to, within, and 
between the nations of Central America 
3. SUPPORT the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central 
American governments 
4. RE-ESTABLISH effective state presence, services and security in 
communities at risk 
5. FOSTER cooperation between the nations of the region, international 
partners, and donors to combat regional security threats264 
This section evaluates current U.S. Central American policy in light of the findings of 
this thesis. CARSI scores well in some areas, but it also has shortcomings that challenge 
to the program’s efficacy. The section analyzes the positives first, followed by the areas 
of concern.  
Some of CARSI’s programs align with sound criminological approaches found to 
be valuable in this thesis. According to the CRS report, the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) have developed programs to train police to become 
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more community-oriented in their criminological approaches, a factor that Chapter III 
showed to correlate with lower incidences of violent crime.265 Moreover, to support the 
development of sound intelligence gathering practices, Meyer and Seelke note that 
“CARSI has supported assessments of forensic laboratories, the establishment of 
wiretapping centers, and the creation of criminal investigative schools,” as well as 
introducing firearms tracking databases and biometric technology.266 Finally, with 
respect to reducing recidivism, CARSI promotes “community-based and municipally led” 
councils where citizens can “analyze problems within the community and develop 
prevention plans to address those problems through activities ranging from vocational 
training to social entrepreneurship projects.”267 
Where CARSI runs into problems concerns its limited ability to help countries 
build sustainable institutional effectiveness. Eric L. Olson and Katherine Moffat of the 
Wilson Center summarize some of CARSI’s main shortcomings in this area, with the four 
most pertinent as follows. First, as Olson and Moffat argue, “CARSI does not represent a 
security strategy but rather a number of programmatic initiatives with laudable goals that 
operate largely independent of each other.”268 Developing sophisticated plans enables 
institutional effectiveness and, as indicated in Chapter IV, correlates with lower violence 
rates. Second, “Counter-narcotics operations often take precedence when broader 
institutional reform goals, such as professionalizing the police or justice sector, are 
unsuccessful or do not enjoy the strong backing of the host government.”269 The lack of 
political will for lasting institutional reforms, as in El Salvador, results from governments 
seeking to immediate results to satisfy popular demand. Third, countries fail in the need 
for “implementing broader institutional reforms, undertaking anti-corruption measures, 
expanding violence prevention programs, and making significant financial contributions 
                                                 
265 Meyer and Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative,” 20.  
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid., 21. 
268 Eric L. Olson and Katherine Moffat, “Executive Summary,” in Crime and Violence in Central 
America’s Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses Are Helping, Hurting, and Can Be Improved, 
ed. Eric L. Olson (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2015), 4. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/crime-
and-violence-central-americas-northern-triangle-how-us-policy-responses-are.  
269 Ibid., 4. 
 84
of their own.”270 Chapter IV examined the structural and resource factors that correlate 
with violence outcomes. Fourth, CARSI programs lack “adequate evaluations” by relying 
on “inputs—how many police were trained, or how much cocaine was seized—and not 
on the impact and outcome of the project.”271 This final point strikes at the heart of the 
thesis’s purpose, which has sought to find, as a means of bringing analytical clarity, 
correlations between the outcomes of violence rates and the inputs of the three common 
explanations for violence: structural economic, institutional, and rational choice 
criminological hypotheses. What follows are several policy implications of this thesis that 
may apply to Central America and beyond. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This section analyzes four of the most significant policy implications that emerge 
from the findings: the proper approach to post-conflict reconstruction in the context of 
transitional justice; the limits of economic development assistance as a violence-
reduction program; the importance of developing of sound criminological approaches; 
and the necessity of building and preserving effective internal security institutions. 
Notably, these implications apply not only to Central American republics but also in 
many cases throughout the world. Variables like poverty, inequality, institutional 
effectiveness, and state criminological approaches are not unique to Central America. As 
such, this section includes reflections on how these policy implications apply to three 
other internationally significant cases: Iraq following the U.S. invasion in 2003, the 
present-day Colombian peace process, and the prospect of a future post-war Syria. 
1. The Proper Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Context 
of Transitional Justice 
Certain key moments of institutional reform or crisis—like those following a civil 
war or period of unrest—offer states the ability to reshape internal security structures. 
One implication this thesis brings to light is the critical necessity of balancing 
purification with the establishment of effective internal security institutions during 
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periods of institutional transition. The priority given to purification often emerges as a 
visceral, if understandable, reaction to the horrors of state terrorism and human rights 
violations. Nevertheless, a more measured and long-term perspective is required to 
ensure the creation of effective security institutions, even if that means prudently granting 
clemency to some who may have critical capabilities and experience. Chapter IV 
examined El Salvador’s conduct of state terrorism during the civil war period, where the 
legacy of state terrorism left its imprint on security institutions, as evidenced, for 
example, in El Salvador’s ongoing preference for using the military to carry out internal 
security policies. Having analyzed El Salvador’s transition through the framework of 
transitional justice literature, this thesis found that several reforms weakened internal 
security institutions by overemphasizing purification at the expense of effectiveness.  
These findings have applicability beyond Central America. In analyzing the 
aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, some have reached similar conclusions. 
Miranda Sissons and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi of the International Center for Transitional 
Justice criticize the stringent de-Baathification program enacted from 2003 onward by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority. Among key lessons learned, according to Sissons and 
Al-Saiedi, is the need during a transition to “design a vetting program, not a purge” to 
ensure vital individuals from the previous regime remain as well as to ensure against 
blind overreaction.272 The authors also refer to the need to “look to the future” in the 
establishment of key institutions—instead of indiscriminately dismissing all of the Iraqi 
army, for instance—such that new institutions are both purified and effective.273 In 
retrospect many agree that the Iraqi insurgency gained a considerable jolt from the 
disenfranchisement of the previous regime’s security institutions, fostering an adverse 
environment for the formation of effective new institutions. Cases like these reveal the 
potential deleterious consequences of neglecting, in the name of purification, the 
formation of effective security institutions, however valuable purification may seem at 
the time.  
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The lessons learned from cases like El Salvador and Iraq have direct relevance to 
cases that are coming into international focus today. Colombia is on the cusp of a formal 
peace agreement to end the decades long Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) insurgency. If reforms follow the Chapultepec model of purification at the 
expense of institutional effectiveness and continuity of competence, the thesis’s findings 
predict the outcome to be disastrous. That path, however, appears to be unlikely, as 
purifying government security institutions has not been a condition demanded by either 
side. Instead, the peace agreement, which the government and FARC agreed to in 
September 2016 but voters narrowly rejected in October, involves what the New York 
Times referred to as a “transitional justice system” that would guarantee political 
representation to the FARC, increased investment in FARC-dominated rural areas, and 
amnesty or reduced sentences for those who committed “all but the most grievous 
crimes.”274 The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reports that a “special legal 
framework” would “FARC fighters, government soldiers and members of right-wing 
paramilitary groups” who confess their crimes to “not serve prison sentences but will take 
part in ‘acts of reparation,’ including clearing land mines, repairing damaged 
infrastructure and helping victims.”275 The public’s rejection of the initial peace 
agreement, in deference to former President Uribe who argued it was too lenient, may 
well cause the FARC to demand more rigid purification of security institutions in 
response to Uribe’s demands. The findings of this thesis suggest that negotiators must 
pursue a precarious balance of purification, reconciliation, and preserving effectiveness 
and continuity.  
In a similar vein, the case of Syria will undoubtedly involve a post-war 
transitional scenario in which the state must rebuild its internal security institutions. The 
post-war Syrian state will likely be faced with the question of transitional justice and how 
to reform Bashar al-Assad’s oppressive security institutions. Popular demand for 
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purification is likely to be high, and the temptation for radical purification will likely be 
strong, due to the human rights violations of the Russian-backed state security forces. 
Nevertheless, this thesis’s findings suggest that the post-war negotiations must give 
serious consideration to vetting and possibly retaining valuable actors from the Assad 
regime to ensure effectiveness of security institutions. Absent this continuity, foreign 
assistance and state resources must promptly be dedicated to training and equipping 
internal security institutions, a distant second best solution.  
2. The Limits of Using Economic Development Assistance as a Violence-
Reduction Program 
In contrast to much of the literature, the thesis’s findings suggest that reducing 
poverty and inequality may not be the most efficient means of ameliorating a violent 
internal security situation. Instead, the findings suggest that other non-economic variables 
correlate more closely with internal security outcomes. Specifically, as Chapters III and 
IV found, institutional effectiveness and sound criminological approaches correlate more 
closely with lower violence rates, a finding exemplified by the case of Nicaragua. 
Nicaragua is one of the most economically disadvantaged countries in Central America. 
Almost every indicator of poverty and inequality examined in Chapter II, with the 
exception of the Gini index, reveals Nicaragua to have more challenges than the average 
Central American republic. Nevertheless, Nicaragua exceeds even much wealthier Costa 
Rica and Panama in citizen security as measured by homicide rates. The findings 
represent indicate that, while economic assistance can be valuable for humanitarian and 
other legitimate purposes, other avenues of investment may result in more efficient 
solutions to the problem of violence.  
In post-war Iraq in 2003, much planning was given to humanitarian assistance and 
economic reconstruction, but critical mistakes—like disbanding the Iraqi army and the 
radical de-Baathification program—reflected a poor understanding of the significance of 
ensuring institutional effectiveness.276 In Colombia, the proposed peace agreement 
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rightly includes some focus on economic issues like increased investments in poorer rural 
areas and the payment of a basic minimum wage for guerilla fighters who surrender.277 
Nevertheless, issues more critical to long-term internal security in Colombia revolve 
around the method of purifying security structures and the preservation of institutional 
effectiveness—conclusions that, as discussed previously, negotiators seem to understand. 
Similarly, once the Syrian conflict comes to an end, humanitarian assistance and 
economic development measures will undoubtedly be required, but planners and 
negotiators will best be able to inculcate a positive security environment through the 
preservation of institutional effectiveness and sound criminological approaches. 
3. Developing Sound Criminological Approaches 
Chapter III examined the strength of state criminological approaches in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador from a comparative perspective. The chapter used the criteria of 
intelligence gathering, community involvement, and recidivism reduction programs. This 
section draws out significant observations and policy implications pertaining to each of 
these criteria.  
a. Building Intelligence Capacity through Fusion Centers 
Good intelligence facilitates law enforcement control over territory. As argued in 
Chapter III, sound information-gathering capabilities are a sine qua non of citizen 
security. One of the distinguishing features that enables Nicaraguan internal security 
institutions to execute their missions effectively centers on sophisticated intelligence 
gathering capabilities, as Chapter III indicated. For states like El Salvador, better 
intelligence would help law enforcement consolidate control over territory contested by 
organized crime. Mauricio García Mejía of the Inter-American Development Bank 
succinctly states the importance of information in relation to good policing:  
Information gathered from various channels is systematically organized, 
analyzed and used strategically to reduce or eliminate the factors that fuel 
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crime. The dynamics of crime do change, so efficient channels are needed 
to capture and process information and stay ahead of the changes.278 
Given the centrality of good intelligence-gathering mechanisms, Bruneau has 
promoted the idea introducing intelligence fusion centers as a first step toward building 
internal security capacity in violent Central American republics like El Salvador.279 In 
the US, intelligence fusion centers have arisen throughout the country, mostly since the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, to coordinate threat analyses with local law enforcement and 
convert collected data into actionable intelligence.280 Bruneau notes that intelligence 
fusion centers have quietly multiplied throughout the country due to their usefulness not 
only in federal counter-terrorism missions, but also under state and local anti-crime 
initiatives.281 In essence, intelligence fusion centers serve as a key component of 
enabling federal, state, and local security institutions to maintain control over territory. 
To Bruneau, intelligence fusion centers in Central America could similarly help states 
with weak security institutions and approaches “begin to insert a state presence, which 
will fill vacuums, or so-called ungoverned spaces, and bring together different elements 
of the security sector, including intelligence agencies, to focus on the gang problem.”282  
Intelligence fusion centers can also help satisfy the demands of popular will that 
often favors short-term results over needed mid- to long-term institutional reforms. 
Standard internal security proposals—like institutional reform, increased funding for 
police, and better education—are, though necessary, mid- to long-range objectives that 
require patience, which unfortunately is an elusive virtue to countries with skyrocketing 
violence rates like El Salvador. The failure of successive reform packages in El Salvador 
has resulted, in part, from to the lack of political will for anything other than short-term 
solutions. Faced with staggering violence, the public favors Mano Dura strategies, which 
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many consider to be deleterious to proper institutional development and contrary to best 
criminological practices. Intelligence fusion centers, on the contrary, could help security 
forces to deliver more immediate results while also inculcating sound criminological 
approaches and more effective institutions. 
b. Community Involvement and Recidivism Reduction Programs 
As indicated in Chapter III, community involvement fosters legitimacy, which in 
turn enables internal security institutions to fulfill their missions and reduces reliance on 
extra-constitutional measures, like those consistently undertaken by El Salvador’s 
military under Mano Dura policies. The findings in Chapter III contrasted Nicaragua’s 
high level of community involvement with its internal security institutions with El 
Salvador’s low level of community involvement. Some of Nicaragua’s most noteworthy 
features include extensive networks of community-based neighborhood watch groups that 
interface with the national police, the public’s involvement in the vetting of PNC recruits, 
and the enlistment of tens of thousands of volunteers in crime-deterrence programs. Other 
countries can and should adapt some of Nicaragua’s best practices to suit local 
circumstances. Notably, such initiatives rely heavily on indigenous human capital and not 
necessarily on financial capital. As community involvement relies primarily on the 
indigenous political and popular will, the findings again point to the limits of foreign 
monetary assistance. 
The example of Nicaragua in Chapter III also revealed that investment in 
recidivism reduction programs correlates with lower violence outcomes. In countries 
where gangs are flourishing, such policies to provide alternate paths and identities for at-
risk youths become even more important. Tough mandatory penalties for gang 
membership, as in El Salvador’s Mano Dura programs, have exacerbated the problem by 
ostracizing at-risk youths and preventing their reconciling with society. Similarly, in 
post-invasion Iraq, Paul Bremer’s decision to conduct a rigid de-baathification program 
served to ostracize 35,000 civil servants from gainful employment and participation in 
 91
society, contributing to the formation of an incipient aggrieved insurgency.283 A positive 
example is emerging in Colombia, where the proposed peace agreement would provide a 
means for all parties to be integrated into society in a constructive manner, as explained 
previously. Syria will likely be faced with a situation that demands judicious approach to 
punishing former security officials with the aim of removing motivation for the 
disenfranchised to undermine the system. 
4. Building and Preserving Institutional Effectiveness 
The policy implications of this section emerge from Chapter IV, which consisted 
of a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of security institutions in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador. This section develops policy implications based on each of the three criteria 
used in Chapter IV: plans, structures, and resources. 
a. Developing Internal Security Plans 
As Chapter IV showed, Nicaragua’s internal security plans have grown out of a 
deliberative process that has incorporated consensus-seeking among internal security 
experts and a balance between justice and mercy in the suppression of criminality. El 
Salvador’s development of internal security plans, on the contrary, was inhibited by the 
institutional disruption that occurred following the Chapultepec Peace Accords’ 
excessive purification. As violence escalated, the democratically elected leaders have 
been beholden to popular demands for quick fixes to insecurity problems, instead of 
developing and implementing sound internal security plans with longer-term 
effectiveness horizons. The conundrum in which El Salvador finds itself has its roots in 
the notion of transitional justice and the question of how to implement a post-conflict 
reconstruction process that, in the aftermath of civil conflict, can satisfy demands for 
purification but also ensure institutional effectiveness. Without that continuity of 
effective individuals experienced in developing criminological plans, countries like El 
Salvador have descended into civil chaos, as the state has trouble maintaining its 
monopoly of violence in the service of the law. Countries emerging from periods of civil 
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conflict—like Iraq, Colombia, and Syria—can and should learn from the cautionary 
example of El Salvador. 
b. Ensuring Viable Security Structures 
As indicated in Chapter IV, structural considerations relevant to effectiveness 
include the institutional networks, processes, and procedures that enable internal security 
forces to effectively fulfill their missions. El Salvador’s radical purification of security 
institutions in the Chapultepec Peace Accords, although well intentioned and popular, 
deconstructed decades worth of structural development. Although reform was 
unquestionably required in the aftermath of El Salvador’s use of state terrorism during 
the civil war, such a radical structural reform left formidable obstacles in the way of El 
Salvador’s new security institutions. Conversely, the security structures established by 
Nicaragua in the aftermath of its 1979 revolution—including a newly reformed national 
police and networks of community-based groups—did not experience drastic 
purifications in the democratic transition following the ousting of the FSLN. Instead, 
structural developments occurred through informal negotiations and consensus seeking 
by elites. The result has been a gradual process of reform of security structures—
including leadership changes, redefinition of missions, and de-politicization of 
organizational identities—to adapt to the democratic era.  
The case of post-invasion Iraq clearly falls into the category of a negative case 
study for ensuring structural viability. As noted previously, Bremer’s order to disband of 
Iraq’s army in 2003 plunged the country into structural disarray. As George Packer notes, 
the decision “came to be seen as one of the disasters of the war” as it put “several 
hundred thousand armed Iraqis on the street with no job and no salary.”284 In Colombia, 
on the other hand, peace negotiators seem to understand the importance of ensuring 
viable security structures; reforms, as indicated above, do not dismantle current structures 
and instead open the door to reconciliation and inclusion. A post-war Syria will likely 
closely be faced with a similar decision as that in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein, namely: How should old security structures be treated?  
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c. Sustaining Resources for Internal Security 
The question of resources is often the one that domestic policymakers think of as 
the easiest to fix with foreign assistance programs. Nevertheless, a country’s reliance on 
U.S. assistance can also inhibit the public’s buy-in to the state security structure, since 
most have little vested financial interest in security institutions funded by foreigners. As 
Gordon Adams and Rebecca Williams note, the U.S. often uses a “security framework” 
where “governance and development is, at best, a secondary goal to immediate security 
requirements.”285 In an apparent response to such concerns, as of 2016, Congress is 
striving to make allocation of CARSI funds dependent on certain structural and 
institutional reforms, among which is more local taxation to pay for institutional 
development. The proposed Consolidated Appropriations Act for 2016 (H.R. 2029) for 
fiscal year 2016 would require the Secretary of State to certify that Central American 
countries are making progress “to improve border security, combat corruption, increase 
revenues, and address human rights concerns, among other actions.”286 The requirement 
to raise revenues from the local population would have two positive effects. First, the 
policy should help encourage states to capture sufficient resources to support their 
institutions. Second, requiring that Central American governments raise revenues from 
their own populations will, over time, create more of a vested interest by the public. Such 
a vested interest should, in turn, create more popular demand for institutional reforms and 
effectiveness. As a result, initiatives like this could also reduce the counterproductive 
popular demand for more immediate, but ultimately deleterious, solutions. 
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